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"And it will always happen that
the one who is not your friend will want
you to remain neutral, and the one who
is your friend will require you to de-
clare yourself by taking arms* Irreso-
lute princes, to avoid present dangers,
usually follow the way of neutrality and
are mostly ruined by it."
- Niccolo Machiavelli
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INTRODUCTION
On March 12, 194-7, In recommending that Congress
authorize $400,000,000 In direct economic and Indirect mili-
tary aid to Greece and Turkey, President Truman said:
M
I believe that it must be the policy
of the United States to support free peoples
who are resisting attempted subjugation by
armed minorities or by outside pressures. 1,1
Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, explaining
the President's recommendation that we take over British
commitments in the eastern Mediterranean, revealed before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 20, that the Securi-
ty Council of the United Nations was investigating Greek
charges that Communist-led armed bands in the north of
Greece were partly supplied and trained by neighboring coun-
tries* On that occasion, Acheson stated:
wIn the event of economic collapse and
government paralysis, these bands would un-
doubtedly increase in strength until they
took over Greece and instituted a totalitarian
government similar to those prevailing in
countries to the north of Greece. The rule
of an armed minority would fasten itself upon
the people of Greece.'* 2
Ten years ago, the peace-loving advocates of con-
stitutional government throughout the world silently watched,
at the opposite end of the Mediterranean, the pitiable spec-
1. Department of State Bulletin , Vol. XVI, No. 403,
p. 536.
2. Ibid ., No. 404, p. b81.
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tacle of a five-year- old Republic struggling unattended in
the awful throes of violent death. In July of 1936, the
combined forces of reaction had struck a formidable blow in
Spain, and for three years a nightmare of terror and counter-
terror stalked that unhappy land.
Today - the Greek Government has charged the
totalitarian states of the Left with training and supplying
Communist bands of guerillas seeking to overthrow that Gov-
ernment. Ten years ago, the Government of Spain charged be-
fore the Council of the League of Nations that the totali-
tarian states of the Right were supplying the Spanish In-
surgents with troops, planes, arms, and munitions.
As the civil strife continued in Spain, and as the
gravity of the situation increased, the legitimate Govern-
ment of that country appealed to non- interventionist Great
Britain- to non-interventionist France- -and to Isolationist
America for permission to purchase- in exchange for gold -
the most desperately needed means with which to defend it-
self. But the United States had been drawn into the camp of
the appeasers, and aid for constitutional governments was
not forthcoming in 1937* The "rule of an armed minority"
was destined to "fasten itself upon the people" of Spain.
Strict "neutrality" was the rule in our policy
toward the Spanish conflict of 1936-1939* We were having
yet another try at non-intervention. Five months after
General Franco* s victory, the most fearful holocaust in the
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history of man was to consume civilizations in every corner
of the globe. History could record yet another failure for
non-intervention.
When, on May 9, the House of Representatives passed
by a vote of 287-107 the bill which would advance the recom-
mended aid to Greece and Turkey, the American people and the
people of all other nations were served with further notice
that we are about to begin a new chapter in American foreign
policy— the chapter of interventionism.
In 1513, Niccolo Machiavelli offered the following
advice to princes seeking success in foreign relations:
"... one ought never to allow a dis-
order to take place in order to avoid war,
for war is not thereby avoided, but only de-
ferred to your disadvantage." 1
If the community of nations had not allowed the
disorder in Spain to take place, would humanity have been
spared the appalling destruction— the"blood, sweat, and tears"
of the world tragedy of 1939-1945? Would we have been spared
the sorrow and the suffering of today? Would we have been
spared the misery which is sure to be the lot of countless
millions tomorrow?
This thesis seeks the answers to the following ques-
tions: "Could we have shed our scales of isolationism ten
years ago? Should we have done so in our Spanish policy? Did
we, in Spain, merely Join the western democracies in quaran-
1. N. Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses
,
Mod-
ern Library, Random House, N. Y.
,
1940. p. 14.
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tilling an arena— an arena in which the counter-monster of
Fascism was ripping the guts from the monster or Bolshevism?
Or was Spain in 1936-1939 something more? Was it the cross-
roads for the League of Nations, for Britain, for France, for
the United States— for all freely elected governments?"
Sumner Welles has said of our attitude toward the
situation in Spain;
"In the long history of the foreign policy
of the Roosevelt Administration, there has Been,
I think, no more cardinal error than the policy
adopted during the civil war in Spain." 1
If we had a definite Spanish policy, who or what
forces decided the path to be trod?
The study undertaken here has been primarily con-
cerned with the official stand adopted by this Government in
regard to the Spanish Civil War. Our Spanish policy raised
a controvery throughout the United States seldom equalled in
bitterness or partisanship. The widely divergent sympathies
expressed in the press and in private conversation, the equal-
ly great difference of opinion voiced from the platform and
from the pulpit, would seem to more than Justify an inquiry
into this problem.
Charles A* Beard has said that official foreign
policy, in democracies as well as in dictatorships, is always
conducted by a few persons. 2 This investigation has made it
1. S. Welles, The Time for Decision
, p. 61.
2. C. A. Beard, A Foreign Policy for America
, p. 3 .
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quit© evident that, even though foreign policy in a democracy
is conducted hy a few persons, the attitude of the United
States toward Spain in 1936-1939 was decided by policy-makers
who were influenced, to no small degree, by public opinion
and by well- organized pressure groups.
But, neither our Spanish policy nor that pressure
from the Right which sought to maintain the status quo of
strict M non- intervent i on, " or that pressure from the Left which
sought to repeal the Spanish embargo, can be clearly under-
stood or fully appreciated without first examining carefully
the issues in Spain. What were the real Issues in Spain?
What was the true nature of the political, social, economic,
and religious institutions of that country? What factors in
Spanish history made the Revolution of 1931 and the counter-
Revolution of 1936 inevitable?
In order to organize more effectively the material
presented in this study, the thesis has been written in
thre e parts. Part I deals with the background in Spain, with
the political aspects and international repercussions of the
A
Civil War itself, and with the attitude adopted by the League
of Nations, by the western democracies, and by the totalitar-
ian states.
In Part II, which concerns the policy or the United
i
States toward the conflict, we find the core of the problem.
Although some space has been devoted to a preliminary consid-
eration of the traditions and innovations in American neut-
,
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rality prior to the passage of the arms embargo against the
Spanish Republic, more detailed consideration has been given
to United States- Spanish relations during the first six
months of the rebellion, to the story behind the Spanish em-
bargo, and to the fierce and determined struggle over our
official policy which raged within and outside the Government.
An attempt has been made, in Part 11^, to follow
the Spanish question from General Franco’s victory through
World War II, and into this, the post-war world, in order to
analyze better the consequences of the appeasement and iso-
lationist policies of the democracies.
The purpose of this thesis has been to review one
of the most controversial and most critical periods in the
recent history of American foreign policy, and to draw atten-
tion to the many defects and often fatal weaknesses of demo-
cracy in the field of foreign relations. We can no longer
afford the luxury of having a foreign policy dictated by
states within our State, if we are to put the interests of the
country as a whole ahead of the interests of special groups.
Those who conduct our foreign policy, those who decide our
foreign policy, and those who influence the decisions of
the policy-makers cannot afford to ignore the moral lessons
as well as the lessons in realistic, practical world politics
which have been learned at such terrible cost during the
decade of disaster since the outbreak of the Spanish Civil
War.
James Vance Elliott
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PART I
THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR-
PRELUDE TO WORLD DISASTER
'‘
:
•
:
1 .
CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT:
THE ROAD OF REVOLUTION
On April 14, 1931, Alfonso XIII was forced to ab-
dicate as King of the Spaniards, and in a bloodless revolution
the Republic of Spain was proclaimed. But the overthrow of
the Spanish Monarchy, the climax to the long struggle between
Republicans and Monarchists, was not the end but the beginning
of a revolution in Spain. Where the political revolution was
to end, a social, an economic, and, in a sense, religious
revolution was to begin.
Revolutions do not just happen, and political sci-
entists since Aristotle, well aware of the fact, have repeat-
edly warned governments that wherever pre-conditions for
change by force exist, there will always be the grave threat
of change by force. The purpose of this chapter, then, will
be to consider the national character of the Spaniard, as well
as to review the history of Spanish political, economic, soc-
ial, and religious Institutions in an attempt to uncover some
of the reasons for the upheaval of 1931 which precipitated
the tragedy of 1936.
A. Psychology of the Spaniard
"And revolutions will be most likely to
happen, and must happen, when the mass of people
are of the high-spirited kind, and have a notion
that they are as good as their rulers.'*
- Aristotle1
1. Politics , New York: Modern Library, 1943. p. 226.
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That Spaniards are, on the whole, an Intensely in-
dividualistic and highly emotional people, there seems to be
little room for doubt. Once individualism is recognized as a
/
trait inherent in the Spanish national character, the strong
tendency of the Spaniard towards anarchy and separatism be-
comes the more easily understood. And once Spanish emotional-
ism, the rule of the heart over the head, is taken into con-
sideration, other Europeans and Americans will not attribute
the commission of many violent crimes in Spain to an unusually
cruel or vindictive streak in the people of that country.
Although a lack of control over emotional tempera-
ment is a good explanation for the almost complete absence or
a national discipline in Spain, Lawrence A. Fernsworth says
that the Spaniard is undisciplined because he is driven— that
when persuaded he is quite willing to accept what he considers
a proper and reasonable discipline.
1
To Gerald Brenan, the Spaniards seem to be by nature
a suspicious and exclusive people who live in small compart-
ments and like to settle their affairs through small groups, a
people who give everything for their family, their friends,
their dependants, their class, but nothing for outsiders.^
In commenting upon their native intelligence. Chap-
man says that, generally speaking, the Spaniards are brilliant-
ly intellectual, that even the man in the street often seems
1. Foreign Affairs
.
July, 1936, p. 666.
2. "The Spanish Labyrinth," p. 4.
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to have a faculty for seeing and expressing things quite clear-
ly with little or no study. However, a lack of intellectual
stamina, Chapman maintains, accounts for the fact that big
business and scientific discoveries have been left to for-
eigners.
1
The contempt for work which has been characteristic
of the upper classes in Spain might help to explain why for-
eigners have taken the lead in business and science on the
Iberian peninsula. Brenan believes that this trait, along
with Spanish pride and impatience, may be attributed to the
fact that Spain came too quickly, without adequate economic
p
or cultural preparation, into her heritage of Empire.
The psychology of the Spaniard has had tremendously
important effects upon the development of political institu-
tions and political trends in Spain. E. A. Peers, in the fol-
lowing passages, presents a somewhat pessimistic view of the
immediate chances of democracy in that country:
"The Spaniards, taken all round, are not
so democratically inclined as most other nations
of western Europe, nor are they as progressive
a people as some of their intellectuals would
like them, and us to believe. . . . But we need
not fall into that error in order to appreciate
the fact that the Spaniards are a great deal more
democratic and progressive than their immediate
ancestors could have foreseen that they would be. H ^
• •••••••••••
"The Spaniards, on the other hand, have a
passion for individualism, and when they attempt
1. "History of Spain," p. 519
.
2. Ibid .
,
p. 11.
3_. "The Spanish Tragedy, 1930-1936," p. 3.
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4to co-operate do so badly or fall altogether.
Till they change their nature, as with the
changing conditions of European life they may
gradually do in the course of centuries, it is
idle to suppose them capable of Federal govern-
ment, and for that reason, their warmest well-
wishers trust that they will never be led into
experimenting with it. 1
But, as Fernsworth has pointed out, the same Spanish
individualism which has stood in the way of cooperation in a
democratic society, has also proved to be a strong obstacle to
the spread of the Soviet brand of collectivism in which the
individual is submerged in the state. 2
Spanish anarchy, then, has stood in the way of both
democratic cooperation and totalitarian collectivism. This
all-important trait in the psychology of the country will be
considered in greater detail in that part of this chapter which
deals with the labor movement in Spain.
B. Forces Shaping the Destiny of Spain
1. Separatism
The marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon to Isabel of
Castille in 1469 marks the beginning of modern Spain. This
reign, says Salvador de Madariaga, was symbolic of the forces
which have been at work in Spanish history-- the forces of in-
dividualism, state consciousness, universalism; of anarchy,
politics, religion; of the individual, the state, the church.^
When the House of Aragon and the House of Castille became one,
1. Ibid., p. 116. 3. "Spain," p. 27.
2. Ibid ., p. 665
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3Spanish anarchy became the State of the Machiavellian Ferdi-
nand and the Spanish State became the Church of the devout
I sabel. 1
But when the strong tendency towards individualism--
which remained a predominant trait of the Spanish national
character--was stimulated by the harsh centralizing policies of
the Bourbons and the Liberals during the 19th century, the
memory of past freedoms and independence was destined to con-
front the authorities in Madrid with three separatist or home-
rule movements. In explaining these nationalist movements, de
Madariaga says:
"Much of the uncompromising and intransigent
character of these home-rule problems, their tend-
ency to separatism, far from being justified by
their more or less solid arguments as ’differences,'
turn out to be the outcome of an identity of char-
acter between Catalans, Basques, and other Span-
iards. The more separatist a Catalan or a Basque
is the more Spanish he reveals himself to be. Just
as the Anarcho-Syndicalist is a separatist from
the Socialist, and the Right from the Left, and
the Church from progress, and the army from the
people, and everything from everything else in
Spanish political life, so the Catalans and the
Basques tend towards separatism from the rest of
Spain." 2
Language was the basis for the Catalan separatist
movement just as it was the basis for the home-rule agitation
in the Basque Provinces and in Galicia, where Gallegan is a
language much closer to Portuguese than to Castilian.
Catalonia, originally an extension of the south of
France in both a linguistic and cultural sense, 3 was one or
1. "Spain," p. 28. 2. Ibid., p. 184.
Brenan. "The Spani sh Labyrinth." p. 25* ==
-... - .
’ 1 '•> •
: p
.
• *
,
'
r ; 1 . ' • >'<'
f
.
.
’
,
> -
'
•-
•
*
' ... - • - . - . . i
i • '• 1 " r "•
.
. .
•
r
t
c i
,j ,:i • i -
•
r i -I i o . . . f
. it- - -
'
-
..
.r
.
r - :\r.S
. . . . . : .
• -
'
V
'
.
the first Roman possessions in Spain. It was occupied by the
Goths in 470, conquered by the Moors in 712, and later ruled as
a Mark by French counts, until one of them rebelled against the
French king in 809, and started Catalonia on her career or in-
dependence.
In 1162, Catalonia and Aragon were united under Al-
fonso II of Aragon. During this union which lasted until 1410,
Catalonia was the leading member of the confederation. Brenan
comments on Catalonia during this period:
”... under the rich merchant class which
ruled it during the Middle Ages, it acquired an
active, enterprising character and a European
outlook very different from its semi-pastoral
neighbors on the interior plateau. . . . 1,1
The modern Catalan movement began between 1822-45,
when the Bourbons and Liberals, determined to make the central
authority supreme, deprived the Catalans of their liberties,
penal and commercial laws, their special tribunals, and their
p
right to use their language in the schools. The importance
of the political repercussions in Spain caused by the revival
of Catalan national feeling is stressed by Brenan:
"
. . . For more than twenty years it poisoned
the political atmosphere in Spain much as the
Irish question had poisoned that in England-
-
with the difference, however, that Catalonia is
not a backward and impoverished island, but the
chief Industrial district of the Peninsula. . . .
Again in 1873, during the brief rule of the
Federal Republic, all except one of the cities
of the south-east from Seville to Valencia re-
membered their origins as Mediterranean clty-
1. Ibid
., p. 25.
Madariaga, op. cit.
,
p. 167*
2. Brenan, op. cit ., p. 27; de
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7states and declared themselves tree ports and In-
dependent cantons, acknowledging no central auth-
ority. " 1
The two most Important forces constituting the
strength of the separatist movement in the Basque Provinces
are religious fanaticism and a stubborn tradition of local
rights. De Madariaga says that although the linguistic claims
of the Basque Nationalists are always a convenient excuse by
which to Justify their separatist ambitions, experts, by class-
ifying 25 different Basque dialects, have disproved the argu-
ment that a true Basque language exists. The historical roots
of Basque nationalism, this author maintains, may be found in
Carlism. 2
2. Carlism
Carlism was born of a dynastic dispute, while
Spanish law permitted women to inherit the throne, the Salic
Law brought to Spain by the Bourbons in 1714, but never recog-
nized, barred females from that inheritance. When Ferdinand
VII died without leaving a male heir, Don Carlos, his brother,
based his claim to rule on the Salic Law. But Queen Dona
Maria Cristina, with the support of the Liberals, had her
daughter Isabel crowned at the death of her husband, and had
herself named as regent.
But religious and political questions were even more
responsible for the cruelty and wanton destructiveness which
1. Ibid., p. 24.
2. Ibid
.
,
p. 179.
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chax'-acterlzed the bitter Carlist-Liberal struggles than were
dynastic issues. The conviction that Liberalism was but a
second wave of the old Lutheran heresy made the Carlists more
fanatical than did their belief in the cause of Don Carlos. 1
When the peasants in the Basque Provinces of the north saw
that the Liberals planned to continue the centralizing policies
of the Bourbon kings, their strong and fierce individualistic
tendencies led them to rally to the support of the Carlists
during the first Carlist War from 1833-40, and again between
1870-76 when the Carlists, supported by monks and priests,
were to raid, plunder, and lay waste the country in an orgy of
anarchy, terror, and counter-terror.
De Madariaga says of the aim of this very disturbing
force in Spanish history:
“During the nineteenth century the chief
strongholds of Carlism were the Catalan country-
side and the high, narrow valleys of Biscay and
Guipuzcoa. Carlism was, of course, a much deep-
er movement that a mere dynastic dispute. The
Carlists represented the forces of religious and
political authority against the liberals, whose
stronghold was Madrid backed by a few Andalusian
towns. . . . Carlism was concerned with keeping
the whole of Spain under the undisputed authority
of king and priest.’' 2
3* Mllltari sm
The position of the Army in the political lire or
Spain before 1931 might be compared with that of the Japanese
Army before the ourbreak of World War II. The officers in
1. Brenan, op. cit
., p. 205.
2. Ibid., p. 181.
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9the Spanish Army drew their authority directly from the king
and in more than one sense represented him. Their economic
privileges and other exceptional rights made them a privileged
class, a group which considered itself and was considered Dy
others to be above the law. In 1905, the Law of Jurisdictions
greatly Increased the political power or the military. This
law, by making attacks on officers or military institutions
offenses to be tried before military courts, gave the Army
authority over any action or criticism which might be inter-
preted as being hostile to either the king or the regime.
The following paragraph presents de Madariaga*
s
view of Spanish militarism:
“Militarism is hardly a correct word in
the case of Spain. It is used here only in
order to conform with the traditional misuse
of it. The evil in Spain is praetorian! sm. . . .
a body of officers, by no means a caste, controls
the political life of the nation, giving but
little thought to foreign affairs and intent
on the preservation of power and on the admin-
istration and enjoyment of a disproportionate
amount of the Budget.
The 19th century transformation or the Army from a
force in favor or liberalism to a power bolstering the cause
of reaction in Spain is explained by the same writer:
"It has been shrewdly said that the inter-
mittent civil war of the 19th century may be
interpreted as a struggle for supremacy between
the army and the Church, ending in a compromise.
This would explain the army’s change of front,
during the Restoration, from its liberalism of
old to its present reactionary attitude. . . The
Church was no longer a rival to the army, for
the Church in Spain, though a strong prop of the Q
structure, would collapse with it if it went. . .',d
1. Ibid ., "p. 136. 2. Ibid., p. 137.
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Paradoxically enough, the Army did enter Spanish
politics at the call of Spain's Liberals.
In 1812, after Napoleon had been driven from Spain
by the British and by Spanish guerillas, a Cortes, controlled
by the Liberals, met at Cadiz, and Spain was given a consti-
tution. But when the Liberals were unable to count on popular
support, they enlisted the aid of the military leader, Rlego,
who governed constitutionally until 1823, when prance, fulfill-
ing her pledge given at the Congress of Troppau three years
earlier to restore legitimate governments overthrown by revolu-
tion, invaded Spain and put the craven Ferdinand VII back
upon the throne.
Riego was but the first of Spain’s military politi-
cians. During the reign of Queen Isabel, five militarists
were to dominate the political scene. Espartero was regent
until 1843 and Narvaez became prime minister in 1844. O’Don-
nell was to carry on the tradition, followed by Serrano and
Prim. In 1868, when the Army and Navy revolted and Isabel had
fled the country, Serrano became head of the Provisional
Government assisted by Prim.
In February of 1873, the Cortes voted for a Republic.
But, after a brief period of chaos which saw Spain with four
Presidents in less than a year, and two Cortes dissolved,
Serrano once again ruled as a military dictator until, on
December 29, 1874, a brigade of soldiers proclaimed Isabel's
son as Alfonso XII of Spain.
1
With the Restoration came the
1. de Madariaga, op. clt ., p. 64.
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alliance of Army with Church against the people.
Spain was to be ruled by her most colorful dictator,
and her last military policeman before Franco, after the rebel-
lion of the Army on September 13, 1923* On that date, General
Primo de Rivera, an Andalusian landowner and captain-general
from Catalonia, announced that he had come to rule for a period
of 90 days during which the nation would be prepared tor demo-
cratic government."*"
De Madariaga gives, as reasons for Rivera’s seizure
of power, the grave state of Moroccan affairs, the political
instability of the period and the collapse of successive
governments, and the conviction of Alfonso XIII that since
neither the Conservatives nor the Liberals were capable of
carrying on the government, dictatorship was the only solution. 2
More attention will be paid to the Rivera dictatorship in
another part of this chapter.
4* Clericalism
Clericalism was a great economic, a great political,
and a great spiritual power in Spain. De Madariaga attributes
the source of clerical strength to the fact that the Church
has been an institution among a people whose fanatical love of
liberty prevented the natural development of other Institutions
which otherwise might have shared influence and power with
Catholicism.
1. Peers, "The Spanish Tragedy, 1930-1936," p
2. Ibid ., p. 251.
3
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The clerical tendencies or the Crown were due to the
tradition which entrusted the education of the heir to clerical
men, while clericalism as a force influencing the middle class
in Spain can be explained by the realization that, although
only a minority of middle- class Spaniards are devoutly Catho-
lic, most of the members of this minority are clericals, and
move actively in the universities, in the field of law, and in
government circles, freely mixing their religion with their
politics.
1
Even though it was in the field of education that
its efforts were greatest, the clerical faction admitted its
inability to educate the masses of the Spanish people* Never-
theless, the religious orders vigorously opposed all lay ef-
forts in that direction* De Madariaga, in voicing the opinion
that clerical education Is bad by any standard, states that the
Church schools have always sought to escape objective examina-
tions, and that instead of discouraging superstition they en-
courage it. 2 The author of "Spain'' cites the report of a
leading expert on the educational question in which it was
calculated that as late as 1923, 50 percent wera being educated
by the State and 25 percent being educated by the Church.
3
In 1936, it was estimated that the illiteracy rate among agri-
cultural workers in some sections of Spain was as high as 85
4percent.
1. De Madariaga, op. cit ., p. I33 .
2. Ibid .
,
p. I36 . 3 . Ibid., p. I3I.
4. Foreign Policy Reports
.
Jan. 1, 1937, P* 247*
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Clericalism has been as great a disturbing force in
the political development of Spain as has been militarism, ac-
cording to what de Madariaga has to say in the paragraph below:
"The history of the nineteenth century in
Spain would have been much quieter and richer in
results had the evolution of the Spanish people
taken place in the absence of clericalism and
militarism. As it is, the almost chronic civil
war, the outward form of that evolution in the
nineteenth century, though beginning as a conflict
between absolutism and liberalism, gradually
degenerates into a conflict between clericalism
and militarism and, what is worse, ends in a
tacit but efficient treaty of peace and coopera-
tion between the two, so that the arms of the
Restoration might well be described as a sword
and a cross ( considered as a weapon) surmounted
by the royal crown. 1,1
Perhaps the most easily explained reasons for the
strong anti- clerical feeling which, throughout the history of
modern Spain, has erupted in periodic outbursts or terrible
passion are economic. Religious orders in Spain have been
among the greatest economic powers in that country. They have
operated clothing factories, flour mills, and laundries in
competition with private industry, paying no taxes and using
the unpaid labor of students and their own members. So great
was the industrial and commercial activity of these religious
orders that, in 193l> it was estimated in the Cortes that the
Jesuits owned a third of the nation's wealth. 2
In commenting upon this materialism and pursuit or
economic activity of the part of the Jesuits and other orders,
1. Ibid ., p. 127*
2. "Background of the War II: The Struggle in Spain, 41
Fortune, April, 1937, p. as.
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de Madariaga warns that:
"Orders which amass wealth and try to in-
fluence social life hy providing clothes, educa-
tion or other advantages in exchange for reli-
gious liberty do so at their own risk."
1
Clericalism will be further considered as a pre-
condition for revolution in that section of this chapter
devoted to the Church in Spain.
C. The Church
At the dawn of modern history in Spain, the Church
of Juan de Mariana and Francisco Suarez, in spite or its in-
dependent attitude towards Rome, was neither an ally nor a
submissive instrument of the State. Although it sided with the
king against the Pope, through such spokesmen as Mariana, the
Spanish Church championed the cause of the people against
tyrannical kings.
Spanish Catholicism in the 16th century was a force
responsible for enriching the world in spirituality, in cul-
ture, and in art. During the Counter-Reformation Spain was
the chief factor in the reformation and purification or the
2Church from within.
i
What happened to the Church in Spain during the
centuries between the Counter-Reformation and the Revolution
of 1931? What could possibly explain the corrosive hate which
gnawed at the heart and brain of millions of Spanish Catholics
1. Ibid
., p. 133.
2. de Madariaga, op. clt ., p. 32.
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until terrible floods of violence were periodically unleashed,
and stemmed only after the wholesale burning of churches and
slaying of priests? De Madariaga attempts to supply an answer
to these questions by saying:
"Those persons who prefer rationalistic
explanations may note that the Spanish Church
was great while it lived on the great univer-
sities of the sixteenth century, and that its
decadence followed that or the celebrated seats
or learning. Ignorant and stubborn monks led
the resistance to progressive measures during
the nineteenth century." 1
"... The Church had sadly neglected its
chief duty in Spain. No institution in any
country had at its disposal assets as splendid as
those the Catholic Church had in Spain to keep
its hold on the people, for Spanish Catholic
culture is exceptionally rich in all that which
most easily touches the soul, and particularly
the Spanish soul. . . . What use had the Church
made of this spiritual treasure? None whatever.
. . *his was the worst crime of the Spanish
Church, for it has let the spirit of the Spanish
people lie fallow, ready for other seeds. . . .
Always on the side of the powerful, the rich,
the oppressive authority, the priest had to be-
come the object of general aversion." 2
From the Restoration of 1874 to the Revolution of
1931, the Church, though steadily losing its influence with
the poor, was gaining in wealth and in political power. In
exchange for gifts, the Church was expected to defend the
interests of the rich against the poor.^ In the words of
Brenan:
"So that one must say that the year 1912
marks the end of the long struggle between the
Church and the Liberal parties. The Church was
1. Ibid., p. 128. 2. Ibid., p. 377*
3. Brenan, op. clt ., p. 48.
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drawing closer to the Army and to the crown and
was seeking In them a means to Its complete tri-
umph. It had made its choice between the poor
and the rich and there was no turning back, it
did not of course wish to. The rich would pro-
vide it with the money needed to win over the
poor and in return it would guarantee ‘social
respect and order.’ That was the policy. Un-
fortunately the bargain did not correspond to
the real circumstances or to the state of opin-
ion in the country and there was no possibility
of its being carried out." 1
Much of the loss of religious faith in Spain can be
blamed on the militant attitude of the Spanish hierarchy, who,
down to the 20th century, believed in destroying their enemies.
Another reason for the hostility of the working classes to-
wards the Church is the success of the propaganda of the
anarchists who consider the priests and the monks as deceivers
who have betrayed the people and gone over to the side of the
rich.
The great political power of the Church and its close
alliance with the State can explain a considerable portion of
the hatred felt by the masses for the hierarchy, the clergy, and
the orders in Spain. Before 1931, civil law and canonical law
existed side by side. Since the bishops were nominated by the
king, and the hierarchy and the clergy were paid from the public
treasury, the bishops and priests shared political power with
secular officers, some of the bishops even sitting in the Sen-
ate. Hence, it was only natural to expect that when political
power was oppressive and corrupt, the wrath of the people
should fall on ecclesiastic and layman alike.
1. Ibid., p. 55
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As an economic power, the Church was even more
powerful. Although during the 19th century It had lost its
great holdings of land, the Church received in lieu of the in-
come from its vast estates an annual subsidy which in 1931
amounted to the sum of $12,000,000. This subsidy was supple-
mented annually by fees for masses, baptisms, marriages, and
burials as well as by gifts and alms. 1
Lawrence A. Fernsworth reporting on the heavy drain
which the Church constituted on the economic resources or
Spain stated:
"It was top-heavy with clergy-- sixteen to
twenty of them could be seen any day at some
modest funeral, each one collecting his lee.
And how many times have I walked into some
cathedral to find a solemn or a pontifical mass
being celebrated in all liturgical pomp with
the assistance of the entire cathedral chapter
and in the presence of only three or four of
the faithful." 2
Despite his strong anti-clerical sentiments, the
Spaniard is, to de Madariaga, a profoundly religious person
with a religion of his own which for all practical purposes
coincides with Catholicism. ^ Clericalism, says this writer, is
a diseased growth along the lines of the healthy development
of Catholic societies, and for this reason it is almost impos-
sible to attack clerical abuses without seeming to attack
Catholic institutions. 4
1. "Background of the WAR II: The Struggle in opaln,"
loc. clt., p. 86.
2. Foreign Affairs
, October 1936, p. 97.
7. TMd., p. ITS. 4. Ifald.. p. 128.
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The strong intolerance of the Catholic Church In
opaln which has sought to prevent all development of independ-
ent thought in that country has been combined with an aggres-
sive attitude and a self-assertion which could hardly be con-
sidered as Christian. The only hope for reform, in the opin-
ion of de Madariaga, is in a movement within the Church Itself
by which its overzealous activities for the education of the
people may be turned inwards. The Spanish Church, he says,
stands in urgent need of self-education . 1
D. The Agrarian Problem
"Everywhere inequality is a cause of
revolution. ... . " - Aristotle2
"Great then is the good fortune of a state
in which the citizens have a moderate and suffici-
ent property; for where some possess much and
others nothing, there may arise an extreme demo-
cracy, or a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may
grow out of either extreme. . . " - Aristotle^
Political scientists through the ages have restated
and elaborated upon Aristotle’s views on the economic basis of
revolution. Of those later thinkers who devoted particular
attention to the agrarian problem, James Harrington, whose
"Oceana" was addressed to Oliver Cromwell in I656
,
was one
whose statements might well be noted. In advancing his theory
that all Commonwealths must inevitably fall unless they possess
the solid foundation of an equal agrarian, Harrington said:
1 . Ibid .
,
p. I36 .
2. "Background—of—the- ffiar 1The—&t^HAggX^-4^-8p€tln-, **
-Loe-^-cirfe^
, p. 211. 3 . Ibid . , p. 192.
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"An equal agrarian Is a perpetual law,
establishing and preserving the balance of
dominion by such a distribution, that no one
man or number of men, within the compass of the
few or aristocracy, can come to overpower the
whole people by their possessions in land.'* 1
Rome had an unequal agrarian, and this, according to
Harrington’s following statement, was one of the principal
reasons for the fall of that Republic:
"
. . .by the time of Tiberius Gracchus,
the nobility had almost eaten the people quite
out of their lands, which they held in the occu-
pation of tenants and servants, whereupon the
remedy being too late, and too vehemently ap-
plied, that Commonwealth was ruined."
2
The failure of the government to solve the agrarian
problem in Spain was one of the major causes of all the social
unrest and revolutionary action which has rocked that country
since the beginning of the 19th century. It cannot be denied
that Spain' s political difficulties were due, for the most
part, to her economic ills--to the poverty of the masses of
her people.
Spain is basically an agricultural country. Or her
total area of approximately 125 million acres, from 50 to 60
million are cultivated and from 50 to 60 million are used for
pasture and underwood, while less than 15 million acres are
either totally sterile or are industrial areas. Nevertheless,
despite the fact that nearly one-half the total area of Spain
is cultivated, the soil of most of these lands is very poor.^
1.
"Oceana," in "Ideal Commonwealths," ed. Morley, J.,
2.
Ibid
., p. 209.
3.
de Madariaga, op. cit .. p. 93.
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The problem of remedying the evils of unequal owner-
ship of land has always been the major one confronting govern-
ments which have sought the answer to their agrarian question.
According to a study made by the Institute of Agrarian Reform,
created by the Cortes to administer the Agrarian Law of I952,
it was discovered that of 800,000 rural families, 350,000
owned no land, and 100,000 owned barely enough to make a living. 1
The Property Department, in December of 1930, had
arrived at statistics which showed that 957,655 acres were
owned by 14 landlords; that in the central southern region of
Spain, out of 38,732,040 acres, 15,971, 102 acres were the
property of 7,266 great landowners, and the remainder was di-
vided among a million peasants. Throughout Spain, 14,721
landed proprietors owned 27,671,750 acres, while 1,755, 305
people owned the remaining 28,415,975 acres, with the vast
majority of these owning two and one-half acres each. In 1936,
the Duke of Mendlnaceli owned 195,680 acres of land; the Duke
of Penaranda 104,345 acres; and the Duke of Alba, according
to J. Alvarez del Vayo, 89,625 acres, 2 but according to Fred-
erick T. Birchall—222,000 acres.
^
The impossible situation of this unequal agrarian
was aggravated by the fact that there was no law which would
limit the liberty of the big landlord to cultivate his vast
estates or not as he saw fit. Quite often he would devote a
1. Foreign Policy Report s, Jan. 1, 1937, p. 247.
2. ,,Freedom r s Battle," p. 143.
3* New York Times
.
June 28, 1936, p. E-5*
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few acres for cultivation while reserving the remainder for
raising bulls or for hunting. 1
Another factor which made the agrarian problem in
Spain even worse was that or absentee landlordism. Many of the
owners of great estates lived in Paris, on the Riviera, in the
Swiss Alps, or, like the Duke of AlDa, spent the best part of
their lives in London. Birchall says that such absenteeism
makes the evil of great landholding in the 19th and 20th cen-
tury worse than it was in the days of patriarchal feudalism
when the landlord lived on his estate among his people, and
looked out for their welfare. 2
The exploitation of large estates through the system
of tenant-farming permitted the big landowner to arrange the
terms of the lease to suit himself, to increase the rent
arbitrarily or evict the tenant whenever he so desired.^ De
Madariaga gives the following account of the living conditions
of the terribly poori
"The existence of a vast agricultural popu-
lation which the governing classes had proved un-
able to save from misery was perhaps the most
serious evil in Spanish life. It was an economic
evil, for it is evident that the wealth of the
country would benefit by a more adequate relation-
ship between the land and its tillers, and that,
through land reform, Spain would certainly succeed
in raising her food supply and a substantial
surplus for export at export prices.
"It was a social and political evil owing
to the social ferments which it developed in the
mass of agricultural labourers. Ill-fed, ill-
1. de Madariaga, op. clt ., p. 114. 2. New York Times
.
loc. clt
. 3* De Madariaga, op. clt ., p. 113.
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clothed, lacking In instruction, with no stake
in the land, the test of them combed out by
emigration, the agricultural labourers of
Andalusia in particular were a ready ground for
all the forms of violent propaganda. . . . Ob-
servers of Spanish political life are well aware
of the curious relationship between the active
anarchist ferment which is endemic in Barcelona
and the passive anarchist attitude which lies in
waiting in the Andalusian fields. This attitude
was fostered by some unwise landlords and estate
managers, too overbearing and stupid to read
the signs of the times; but worse still, it was
fostered by the Government itself. . . .‘* 1
Many small farmers and landless agricultural workers
had an annual income inadequate to provide them with but the
barest necessities of life. The official records of the
province of Avila show that, during the last years of the
monarchy, out of 13,530 land tax- payers, 11,452 had a daily
Income of less than one peseta (about 12 cents in 1936), and
1,758 earned less than five pesetas per day. In what, to de
Madariaga, seems a fairly representative Spanish province, 91
percent of the landowners earned less than an average industria
worker. Out of 1,026,412 landowners paying a tax, 1,007,616
had incomes of less than eight pesetas per day, while 647,546
2
had a daily income of less than one peseta.
The Institute of Agrarian Reform estimated in 1932
that the normal yearly Income of laborers on estates in
southern Spain was from 700 to 900 pesetas per year, while
annual expenses, at the barest minimum, equalled 2,000 pesetas.
1. Ibid ., p. 115. 2. Ibid ., p. 113.
3. Foreign Policy Reports , Jan. 1, 1937» p. 247
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Spain, then, was confronted not only by the problem
of unequal agrarian, but by the correlative problem of dread-
ful poverty. Aristotle has said of the effects of such misery
on behavior:
“But he. . • on the other hand who is very
poor, or very weak, or very much disgraced,
finds it difficult to follow rational principles." 1
The half- starved agricultural workers who have
sacked convents and burned churches in Spain could scarcely
have been following rational principles. Exploitation, op-
pression, and hunger, when added to the Spaniard* s inherent
tendency towards anarchy and emotionalism, could hardly
promise stability and success to that government which failed
to solve the agrarian question in Spain*
E* The Labor Movement
The labor movement which developed in Spain during
the latter half of the 19th century began with the granting
of the Constitution of 1876, the constitution which was to
last until 1923* When Karl Marx and Michael Bakunin parted
company and split the European labor movement wide open in
1879, the more pesslsmistic socialism of Madrid became quickly
nationalized, became institutionalized, and pursued the means
of political action to gain its ends. But, in Barcelona, the
anarchism which had sprung from the effect of Jean Jacques
Rousseau's optimism upon the unrestrained individualism of
1. Ibid., p. 190
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the Catalan, and inspired Dy the teachings or Bakunin, re-
sulted in a labor movement or ritful and violent agitations
Brenan describes the errects of Bakunin's teachings
"The nineties were everywhere the period
of anarchist terrorism. We have seen how the
loss of its working-class adherents and the
stupidity of police repressions led to this.
But there were other causes as well. The reign
of the bourgeoisie was now at its height. Their
measures, their philistinism, their insufierable
self-righteousness weighed upon every thing.
They had created a world that was both dull and
ugly and they were so firmly established in it
that it seemed hopeless even to dream of revo-
lution. ... To shock, to Infuriate, to register
one's protest became the only thing that any
decent or sensitive man could do. . . . Bomb
outrages were acts of revenge for prison tortures
or unjust sentences rather than protests against
society in general.'* 2
At the turn of the century, an attempt was made to
introduce into Spain from France a form of "anarchist commun-
ism," which had secret directing groups and a central organi-
zation. When the loose federation of collectives which had
been formed were thrown into bitter conflict by Spanish in-
dividualism, the compromise of Anarcho-Syndicalism was reached.
sophy of Georges Sorel, was a movement which aimed at the
uniting of all workers, irrespective of religious or political
and the pursuit of the means of direct action. 1
upon the emotional and individualistic Spaniard:
Syndicalism, which has its source in the philo-
1. de Madaria
2. Ibid . t p.
3* Brenan, op. clt ..
3
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,
p. 119*
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views. In one group. Inspired with a new fighting spirit,
this organization was to reject all corporate action or a
political nature and to use the single weapon or the thorough
and violent general strike to gain its ends.
1
In 1910, the C.N.T* was organized at Seville, its
aim was to use syndicalism to fight the employers in order to
gain the end of anarchism. In 1927, the F.A.I., a secret
society composed exclusively of anarchists, was rounded with
the mission of deliberately and systematically preparing for
a social revolution. It planned to penetrate and control the
syndicalist organizations as soon as the latter could be re-
p
established.
Summing up the revolutionary trends of spaing labor
movements, Brenan says that over 60 years of anarchism had
achieved practically nothing in the rural districts or the
country, since in 1936 the standard of living of agricultural
workers in the south was the same as it had been in 1670. In
the cities, however, the Anarcho-Syndicalist movement had
resulted in a considerable increase in wages. ^ But just as
much if not more good was done by socialism- -and without the
violence and terrorism which were characteristic of the agi-
tation of the Anarcho-Syndicalists.
1. Brenan, op. cit
., p. 170.
2. Ibid ., p. 172-173.
3.
Ibid
., p. 187.
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F. Politics and Politicians
"What share Insolence and avarice have In
creating revolutions, and how they work. Is
plain enough. When the magistrates are in-
solent and grasping they conspire against one
another and also against the constitution rrom
which they derive their power, making their
gains either at the expense of individuals or
of the public." - Aristotle
1
The diseased growth of French despotism which ob-
structed the healthy development of political ideas and in-
stitutions in Spain after the accession of the first Bourbon
king, was largely responsible for the agitation, the violence,
and the resulting instability which were to constitute the
political pre-conditions for revolution—for the Revolution
of 1931 which ended in the fall of the Spanish House or Bourbon.
During the reign of Charles III (1759-l78b), tne in-
vasion of French 13th century ideas caused a split in Spain'
s
intellectual leadership. Of the two schools or though 1;which
were the result of the schism, one remained faithful to the
old ideal of symbolic monarchy, a hold-over from Hapsburg days,
while the second preached a philosophy of sovereignty of the
ppeople.
The introduction of French centralization and trench
State despotism was to result in an attack upon the tradition-
al rights and liberties of the Catalans and the Basques, and
in an attack upon the political and economic power of the
1. Ibid .
, p. 213.
2. de Madariaga, op. clt .. p.
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Spanish Church.
As soon as he was recognized as King or Spain, Philip
V, by depriving Catalonia of her Cortes and liberties in 1714,
was to begin the vigorous Bourbon policy of centralizing, which
later stimulated the modern separatist movement in Catalonia
and in the Basque Provinces.
In 1754, a Concordat was signed which placed the
Spanish Church under the king, and during the reign or Charles
III, many measures were undertaken to subject the clergy to the
authority of the State. In 176b, a law requiring bishops to
guard against priests saying anything derogatory about the
State or the royal family was passed, and one year later, the
Jesuits were expelled. 1
During the 19th and 20th centuries, the Spanish
people attempted to build new institutions, but made the great
mistake of trying to erect them upon the ruins of the old in-
stitutions. When the Monarchy was restored in December of
1874* after little more than a year of a Federal Republic which
ended in complete failure, there was a chance that political
habits might be developed in the Spaniard. But Don Oanovas del
Castillo, the Conservative politician who was largely responsi-
ble for the Restoration, was determined not to trust to free
elections. Brenan says of canovas and of the latter's fatal
error in not enforcing an honest election law:
1. Chapman, "A History of opaln,
" p. 446.
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•'Although the press was free--that was one
thing he insisted upon- -there was not a single
honest or genuine election to the Cortes during
his life or indeed (since the system he set up
continued after him) until the disappearance or
the Monarchy in 1931* 1,1
All elections after the Restoration were controlled
from Madrid and rigged in the municipalities. J-f, through
some oversight, the •'wrong" man was elected, irregularities
were immediately discovered, the would-be councillor suspended,
and new lists of voters drawn up including only the names or
those who could be trusted to vote the "right" way. Orten the
same "trusted" voters were listed more than once, and according
to Brenan, during one election, a cemetery of 700 "trusted"
o
but departed souls voted as a body for the official candidate.
The Government appointed large landowners, or
"caciques," to organize districts, and to see that the "right"
candidates were elected. During 1840-1917* when this evil was
at its worst, the owners of great estates, in return for this
service to the corrupt political authorities, were given the
protection of civil governors, judges, magistrates, and police.
Given authority to appoint mayors in the small towns and vil-
lages, to control local judges, and to distribute taxation, the
"caciques" ruined their enemies with law suits, and excused
themselves and their friends from paying taxes while levying
a double or triple tax on those they hated.
^
1, Ibid., p, 3* 2, Ibid., p. 8*
3. Brenan, op. clt «. p. 7»
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Brenan quotes the distinguished historian Gumersindo
de Azcarate on "caciquism:
"
"Caciquism is simply a feudalism of a new
kind, a hundred times more repugnant than the
military feudalism of the Middle Ages . "1
During this period, the law courts gave no protection
to the people for the Judges and magistrates took their in-
structions from above as employees of the state, condemning or
2
acquitting at a word from the civil governor.
The corruption of Government employees, especially
agents responsible for the collection of taxes, was notorious.
In 1876, the President of the Supreme Court declared that one-
third of all taxes collected went into the pockets of the
agents and never reached the Government.
^
Alfonso XIII, the last monarch to rule Spain, was a
king from May 17, 1886, the day of his birth, and was declared
of ag© in 1902. From de Madariaga's account, Alfonso was no
statesman, but a first-rate politician:
. the king, while playing the game of
outward politics with liberals and conservatives,
came gradually to recognize but two parties in
the real politics of the nation: the Church
and the Army."
4
Although Spain officially adopted a neutral stand
during the first World War, the conflict had severe repercus-
sions in that country. The nation was split in two, with the
1. Ibid., p. 8- 3. Ibid., p. 9.
2. Ibid .
.
p. S. 4. Ibid., p. 109.
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liberal, progressive Left supporting the Allied cause, and the
reactionary, clerical Right sympathetic to the uentral Powers.
De Madariaga says of the effect of foreign vitality which en-
tered Spain and was in part responsible for the revolutionary
general strike of August 10, 1917:
"The aim was political as well as social:
a socialist democratic republic. The strike
spread over the whole country. ... A state of
war was declared. . . . Three days sufficed to
put down disorder. The Revolution left behind
2,000 prisoners, several hundred dead and wounded,
and the Constitution dead. The Labour hotheads
had delivered the nation and its hopeful assem-
bly into the hands of the only force that re-
mained: the Army." 1
The political scene in Spain between the end of the
World War and the coup d'etat of General Primo de Rivera in
1923 was a panorama or strikes, disorders, crimes, of political
and industrial murders, and of inefficient administration and
military disaster in Morocco.
The year 1918 saw a Liberal government headed by
Count Romanones in power. The fall of this regime was to see
Spain pass through a brief period of Conservative reaction.
But the government of Antonio Maura, in spite of its resorting
to the most unscrupulousof methods to perpetuate its power,
fell, to be succeeded by the Sanchez Toca ministry, respite
the fact that the Sanchez Toca administration was composed of
die-hard conservatives, determined efforts were made to solve
the industrial problem and also make justice more than a word
1. Ibid., p. 238
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in Spain. But, unable to reconcile the employer's federation
to the labor groups, the Toca government fell in March or 1922,
and was succeeded by a coalition government of Liberals and
Conservatives under Sanchez G-uerra. This ministry was also or
short duration, quitting office when it failed to settle the
Moroccan question. A general election, held while a coalition
of Liberals and reformers was in power, resulted in a majority
for the government and in the presence of five socialist mem-
bers from Madrid in the government.
But the Moroccan situation remained unsolved, and the
Army officers, no longer receiving the prize plums of leading
overseas posts, were becoming more and more discontented until,
in September of 1923, the Army rebelled and General Primo de
Rivera, with the acquiescence of Alfonso XIII, became dictator
of Spain. Constitutional government had come to an end in
Spain. The king had broken his word, and in so doing removed
the foundation of the Restoration. 1
The Spanish people had the alternative of a military
dictatorship forced on them in 1923 because neither Liberals
nor Conservatives, governing under the uonstitution of 1876,
could bring order out of chaos- -could bring the political
stability which Spain so desperately needed.
From November of 1885 to May of 1902, a period or 16
years and five months, Spain was governed by 11 ministries,
each having an average life of one year and seven months. But,
1. de Madariaga, op. clt .. p. 252,
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under Alfonso XIII, from May of 1902 to September of 1923, the
Spanish people were ruled by no less than 33 ministries, an
average duration of seven and one- half months for each regime. 1
During the rule of the Conservatives between December of 1902
and July of 1905, five prime ministers and 66 new ministers
held office.
2
The author of "Spain" comments on the weaknesses of
the political system which prepared the way for Primo de Ri-
vera’s seizure of power:
rt The main fault of the old system, that
which caused its incompetence and most of its
corruption, was its instability. The kaleido-
scopic succession of prime ministers ana cabinets
did not permit any political program to mature,
any cabinet minister to acquire command over
the affairs of his department, any complicated
and delicate reform to take root and benefit
by experience . "
3
But General Rivera was neither a Mussolini in minia-
ture nor Just another Spanish military policeman. De Madariaga
says of the man and of the dictatorship:
"His originality lay in that he could not
be easily classed as a Liberal or a reactionary
leader. The century was rather eclectic in
politics, and Primo de Rivera was of his century.
Thus we shall see him a Liberal in municipal
affairs, a Socialist of sorts in labour matters,
a Conservative in constitutional ideas, a react-
ionary in education, an opportunist (with but
scant opportunities) in military administration,
a truly spirited leader in Moroccan affairs, and
an indifferent amateur in foreign policy. ,,Zf
"In its main lines the dictatorship was a
1. Ibid., p. 269.
2. Ibid
.
,
p. 218.
3. Ibid .
,
p. 268.
4. Ibid., p. 255.
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regime founded on force rather than on authority,
with a strong centralist tendency, relying on
the Army, favourable to the Clerical Party and
the Church, aristocratic and friendly to big
landowners and sympathetic to Socialism as
opposed to Syndicalism.
1
. . . The dictatorship
made the nation pay too dearly for its material
progress and in a coin which is more precious
to her than wealth— liberty, Justice and self-
respect.
Riots, strikes, civil discontent, protests from in-
tellectuals, and the fall in the exchange value of the peseta
were all factors contributing to the growing dissension be-
tween king and dictator, which came to a climax when, on Janu-
ary 30, 1930, Rivera was forced from office and retired to
Paris where he died two months later.
5
Brenan, in drawing three conclusions from the fall
of the dictatorship, says that no government which has to
depend upon the Church, the Army, and the landlords can find
permanent support in Spain, that no government which represents
a purely material well-being at the cost of liberty can sat-
isfy the Spanish people, and that no dictator can prosper for
any length of time in a country where half the population sits
in cafes and criticizes the Government.
General Damaso Berenguer succeeded Rivera as premier,
but the year 1930 was one of discontent, a year of nation-wide
strikes, a year which ended with the revolt, on December 12, of
a garrison of 6,000 officers and men at Jaca, near the French
1. Ibid., p. 256. 2. Ibid., p. 263.
3. de Madariaga, in Encyclopedia tfrittanica, Vol. 21,
o. 146.
4. Ibid., p. 84.
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1
On February 15, 1931, Alfonso suspended constitu-
tional government and Sanchez Guerra, leader of the Constitu-
tional party, was called in to form a cabinet. Three days
later, the king changed his mind, re-established censorship,
concentrated troops in Madrid, and asked Admiral Aznar to form
o
a royal government.
-
On March 22, in a Conservative attempt at concilia-
tion prior to the municipal elections scheduled for April 12,
a royal decree was issued restoring civil liberties, and uni-
versities were reopened. But the king's action on February
18 had united Socialist and Republican parties and brought the
threat of general strike and revolution closer.
^
When the crucial municipal elections were held on
Sunday, April 12, the Republicans, Socialists and other Left
groups captured 40 out of 49 provinces. Two days later, Al-
fonso resigned as King of Spain and went into exile. A new
Ship of State, the Republic of Spain, was launched on the
stormy sea of Spanish politics. The next five years were
destined to determine whether or not the people of Spain were
as unready for constitutional government as they proved to be
in 1812, or in 1837, or in 1376.
Chapman, writing in 1925, had warned that too much
weight should not be given to the political gropings of the
1. Foreign Policy Association, News Bulletin
, January
2, 1931.
2. Ibid., February 27, 1931. 3. Ibid., April 3, 1931
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Spanish people, for the power and the influence of the nobility
the wealthy and the clergy were still important factors with
which democracy in Spain would have to contend. 1 The success
or failure of democratic procedures and institutions in that
country, then, was not a question to be decided by the people
alone.
1. Ibid
., p. 511
.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT:
THE ROAD TO COUNTER-REVOLUTION
In drafting the Constitution of 1931, the Left in
Spain sowed the wind of social, economic, and religious revo-
lution. Five years later, the Spanish people reaped the whirl-
wind of the bloodiest counter-revolution in recent history.
The purpose of Chapter II will be to follow the Spanish Repub-
lic down the road which led to its ruin, in order to under-
stand better the real Issues in Spain during the five-year
life of the Republic, the issues which were responsible for the
outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July of 1936 .
A. The Constitution of 19311
"Constitutional governments and aristo-
cracies are commonly overthrown owing to some
deviation from Justice in the constitution
. itself." - Aristotle
2
The constituent Cortes of Republican Spain convened
on July 14, 1931, and began the momentous task of framing a
new constitution. On December 1, the new system of fundamental
laws was submitted to a parliamentary committee for final re-
drafting.^ The new charter, which contained 123 articles deal-
ing with such vital subjects as National Organization, Nation-
1. See Current History
,
June, 1932, for complete text
of the Constitution of the Spanish Republic, pp. 374-384.
2. Ibid ., p. 227.
3 . Foreign Policy Bulletin . Dec. 11, 1931*
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allty. Rights and Duties of Spaniards, the Cortes, the Presi-
dency of the Republic, Government, Justice, the Public Treasury
and Guarantees and Amendments of the Constitution, represented
the result of a compromise between all the parties of the Left
and Center. The Socialists, represented by Fernando de los
Rior, Francisco Largo Caballero, and Indalecio Prieto had in-
sisted on such drastic measures as the separation of Church
and State, the expulsion of the Jesuits, reform of the civil
code, and state control of education.
The three chief defects of the Constitution were, in
the opinion of de Madariaga, the weakness of the Executive,
the lack of a Senate, and the attack on the power and influence
of the Church.
1
Article 81 permitted the President of the Republic
to dissolve the Cortes but once. If he used this power twice,
the Cortes elected Immediately afterward had to devote its
first debate to an examination and approval or disapproval of
the action. The unfavorable vote of an absolute majority of
p
the Cortes would result in the removal of the Chief Executive.
Although the Commission of Jurists appointed by the
Provisional government had recommended that two houses of
parliament be formed, a lower house plus a Senate of 240 mem-
bers, the strong opposition of the Socialists defeated this
proposal.^ Thus, even before the new vehicle of government
took to the road, its mechanics refused to fit it with brakes.
1. Ibid
.
,~pT 301.
2. Current History , June, 1932, pp. 374-384.
3. de Madariaga, "Spain,
" p. 301.
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Article 3 and Article 26 expressed the Republic's
attitude towards the Church. In the former, Spain was declared
to have no official religion. In Article 26, the State, regions,
provinces and municipalities were prohibited from maintaining
or favoring financial aid to the Church or to religious organ-
izations; the Jesuit Order was dissolved and other religious
orders were regulated by special law; clerical organizations
were prohibited from the practice of industry, commerce or
teaching; religious orders were obliged to submit annual ac-
counts of the investment of their wealth, and all orders had
to submit to the tax laws of the country. Article 26 further
stated that the property of religious orders may be nationalized.
De Madariaga considers this attack upon the Church
as both unwarranted and unwise. He says:
"Had the Republic left it alone, the mere
creative work of the new regime in the field of
letters, arts and sciences would have more than
sufficed to reduce the Church to political im-
potence, for the Church had a tendency to fall
owing to its own weight." 1
The new Constitution further provided, in Article 44,
that the ownership of all types of property may be the object of
forced expropriation in the interest of the social welfare, and
that the socialization of property may also be carried out by
means of indemnification. Public services and enterprises which
affect the common interest, wherever such action is socially
desirable, may also be nationalized under the authority of this
article.
!. Ibid
.
,
p. 309.
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The text of those articles In the Constitution or
1931 which were to make the charter of the new Republic a pre-
condition for counter-revolution has been included in Appendix
I of this thesis.
B. The Republic - 1931 to 1933
1. The First Year
On April 15, 1931, the constituent Cortes of the
Spanish Republic was controlled by a coalition or socialists,
Radical Socialists, Accion Republicana, and other Left parties.]
The seats were distributed as follows: 1
Socialists 116
Radical Socialists 60
Republican Action (Azana) 30
Gallegans (voting with Azana) 16
Catalans 43
Federalists 17
Radicals (Lerroux) 90
Right (Agrarians, Basques, etc.) 60
Progressives (Zamora and Maura) 22
Under this alliance, headed by Manuel Azana, leader
of the Accion Republicana, the new Republic was to follow a
reformist rather than a revolutionary policy. By the end of
the year, Alcala Zamora, head of the Center parties, had been
elected as President, and the Constitution had been approved.
After Azaria’ a accession to power, one of the first
acts of the Cortes was to pass the "Law for the Defense of the
Republic." This law gave the Home Secretary power to suspend
public meetings, suppress associations, close clubs, take over
unauthorized arms, and named eleven "acts of aggression
1. de Madariaga, op. cit ., p. 300.
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against the Republic" which made such offenses as strikes,
rioting, spreading of subversive rumors, defense of the Mon-
archy, and official negligence punishable by fines or exile.
The fear of a counter-revolution was probably responsible, as
Peers says, for the paradox of having a Constitution guar-
anteeing the rights of the Individual existing side by side
with a law which placed such rights at the mercy of a single
minister. 1
One of Azafla’ s first moves was against the power and
prestige of the bulwark of the old regime, the Army. The
Prime Minister himself took over the Ministry of war, abolished
the Law of Jurisdictions,
2
abolished the Supreme Council of
War and Navy and all ranks above that of division general, re-
moved all officers not actively supporting the Republic, re-
duced the number of officers from 22,000 to 12,000, but offered
those who resigned full retirement ?ay.^ It was in following
this policy that Azana made one of his worst mistakes, while
failing to destroy the power and influence of the Army, he did
succeed in making it the Republic’s most dangerous enemy.
The war of Church on Republic began less than one
month after the fall of the Monarchy. On May 7, Dr. Pedro
Segura, Cardinal-Archbishop of Toledo, Issued a pastoral let-
ter in which he said:
1. Ibid .
, p. 76.
2. See p. 9
•
3. Foreign Policy Bulletin
,
May 6, 1932.
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u In these moments of terrible uncertainty,
every Catholic must measure the magnitude or
his responsibilities and valiantly perform his
duty. If we all keep our eyes fixed on higher
interests, and sacrifice what is secondary to
what is important; if we unite our forces and
prepare to fight with perfect cohesion and
discipline, without vain parade, but with faith
in our ideals, with abnegation and the spirit
of sacrifice, we shall be able to look at the
future with tranquillity, confident of victory.
"If we remain quiet and idle; if we allow
ourselves to give way to ’apathy and timidity';
if we leave the road open to those who are at-
tempting to destroy religion or expect the bene-
volence of our enemies to secure the triumph of
our Ideals, we shall have no right to lament when
bitter reality shows us that we had victory in
our hands, yet knew not how to fight like intre-
pid warriors, prepared to succomb gloriously
.
On May 24, the Vatican refused to accept Luis Zulueta
a distinguished scholar though unorthodox Catholic, as Ambassa-
dor from the Spanish Republic. The virtual expulsion of Card-
inal Segura, on June 14, marked the beginning of the Republic's
counter-attack upon the Church. On October 13, the Cortes, in
3
accepting Article three of the Constitution, voted to abolish
Roman Catholicism as the State religion. In January of 1932,
the Jesuits were dissolved and expelled. Three months later,
the Cabinet introduced legislation restricting the right of the
Church to own property, empowering the government to control
rigidly the activities of clergymen, and placing church schools
under State supervision. 2
1. Peers, "j-he Spanish Tragedy 1930- 1936 , " p. 53
2. Foreign Policy Bulletin
, May 6, 1932.
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From its first days, the Republic was attacked by
the extremists of the Left as well as by the extremists of the
Right. Soon after the abdication of Alfonso XIII, the Anarch-
ist Federation allied itself with a Syndicalist organization,
the National Confederation of Labor. This Anarcho-Syndicalist
combination was responsible for most of the early disorders. 1
In January of 1932, riots broke out in Bilbao and
Valencia, but Azaha, Just as firm with the Left as with the
Right, crushed the rebellion by employing infantry, cavalry,
p
and artillery.
Ernest Galarza, in summarizing the achievements of
the Republic during its first year, listed the five major prob-
lems still to be solved as: reconciliation of separatists, in
particular the Catalans; balancing the budget; introduction of
a public works program and a program of unemployment relief;
repeal of the Law for the Defense of the Republic; and the
passage of an agrarian reform law acceptable to both the
peasants and the landlords.^
2. The Fall of the Azana Ministry
An attack on the Socialists by Alejandro Lerroux,
leader of the Radicals, in which he invited the Monarchists to
participate in a Right coalition in the event Azana were
forced from power, was in part responsible for the Spanish
1. Peers, op. cit ., p. 90. 2. I bid . , p. 91.
3. Foreign Policy Bulletin
. May 6, 1932.
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Army's first attempt at a coup d'etat on August 10, 1932.
General Jose Sanjurjo, former head of the Civil Guard, in an
effort to "save the Republic," took the lead in a movement
which resulted in the seizure of Seville and the attempted
seizure of government buildings in Madrid. The revolt failed
due to the prompt action of the Government, and to the paralyz-
ing effect of a general strike called in Seville by the Social-
ist union. 1
On September 9, the Cortes passed by an overwhelming
vote the Catalan Statute and the Land Reform Bill. The first
act declared Catalonia an autonomous region within the Spanish
State, and provided for a Generali tat, consisting of a Parlia-
ment, an Executive Council and a President (the President to
be elected by the Cortes). The Generalitat was given power to
control municipal administration and the police and court sys-
tems. It was also given authority to create new sources of
revenue. 2
The .Agrarian Law, a concession to the extreme Left,
provided for the expropriation of all land in areas where the
evil of large estates was widespread. Indemnification for the
land was to be allowed only on the value of the land as as-
sessed for taxation.^
The vigorous suppression of an attempted military
revolt in August, and the attack launched upon the separatist
1. Foreign Policy Bulletin
, August 19, 1932.
2. Ibid., October 14, 1932.
3* Peers, op. clt ., p. 100.
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and agrarian problems In September were steps which enhanced
the prestige of the Azana regime. Brenan says of the Republic
during this period:
"The autumn of 1932 saw Azana at the height
of his career. In the eyes of Europe the new
Spanish Republic had taken root and consolidated
itself. Spain, it seemed, had ceased to be the
country of the Black Legend- -a semi-Balkan na-
tion with a glorious history— and had become one
of the most modern and dignified states in
Europe. 1,1
But the prestige of the first Azatta ministry was to be
of short duration, for, in January of 1933, armed revolts oc-
curred in Barcelona, Lerida, and Valencia. The Government was
expecting further trouble in Catalonia and Andalusia when an
anarchist uprising took place in the hamlet of Casas Viejas.
The ruthless suppression of this disturbance, during which 25
were killed, caused a wave of indignation to sweep the country
and was to result in the Government and the Socialists losing
the support of the working classes.
2
The enthusiasm of the
masses for the Azarta administration had been cooling since the
early days of 1932 when 120 of the more prominent members of
the C.N.T. and F.A.I. had been deported to Spanish Guinea
without trial, following the collapse of the uprising in
Catalonia.
^
The results of the municipal elections held on April
23, 1933 considerably weakened the position of the Government,
1. Ibid., p. 246.
2. Brenan, op. clt .. p. 248.
3. Ibid ., p. 25^.
4. Foreign Policy Bulletin
, May 12, 1933*
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for the Azana party captured hut one-third of the seats, with
the Monarchists and the Right-wing Republicans gaining two-
thirds.^
On May 17, the Cortes passed the "Law of Confessions
and Congregations," and on June 2, the day after the Vatican
had published a circular letter condemning the bill. President
Aleala Zamora signed it.l The law forbade the religious orders
from engaging in any kind of political activity, in commerce or
industry, and prohibited orders from engaging in teaching ex-
cept to instruct its own members.
With the prisons full of extremists, and the nation
virtually held in check by armed police, the Azana regime,
having already antagonized the Right, was, in the autumn of
1933, equally unpopular with the Left.
On September 12, as a result of the elections to the
Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees nine days earlier in
which the Monarchists made a considerable show of strength.
President Aleala Zamora requested and received the resignation
of Premier Azafia* Alejandro Lerroux, called in to succeed
Azana, formed a cabinet made up primarily of members from the
conservative Radical party, of which he was the leader. 2 Al-
though Lerroux* s party had the backing of multi-millionaire
Juan March, the big landholders and other large property own-
ers, and was not opposed to the Church, it could not be con-
1. Peers, op. clt ., p. 136-137*
2. Foreign Policy Bulletin , September 22, 1933*
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sidered as reactionary; so, the Spanish Republic at the fall of
Azana did not pass into the hands of anti-republican elements,
but rather Into the hands of right-wing republicans.
C« The Republic-- 1955 to February of 1956
1.
The Election of 1933
Public sentiment in Spain favored general elections
after the resignation of the Republic’s first ministry. This
was due to the prevailing feeling that, since the municipal
elections of April and the recent elections to the Tribunal of
Constitutional Guarantees indicated a swing to the Right, the
Cortes of 1931 was no longer representative. 1 Elections were
accordingly scheduled for November 19
.
The campaign which followed brought to the forefront
of the Spanish political scene for the first time, Jose Maria
Gil Robles, leader of the Catholic Popular Action party. Gil
Robles, who had served the dictator, Primo de Rivera, as an
organizer, had been labeled MFascist ,, by most of his enemies.
Although, as Peers says, "Fascist" and "Marxist" were current
terms of abuse in Spanish politics and shouldn't have been
taken seriously,
2
Gil Robles seems to have aimed at the estab-
lishment of a regime similar to the Austrian Corporate State.
3
Brenan quotes from a speech by Gil Robles to his followers made
Just prior to the 1933 election:
1. Foreign Policy Bulletin
,
September 22, 1933
•
2. Ibid ., p. 143.
3. Brenan, op. clt ., p. 267.
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HWe must move towards a new state. What
matters If it means shedding blood? We need an
integral solution- -that is what we are seeking.
In order to realize that ideal we will not de-
tain ourselves In archaic forms. Democracy is
for us not an end, but a means to go to the con-
quest of a new state. When the moment comes
either the Cortes will submit or we will make it
disappear. 1,1
Peers, in maintaining that Gil Robles had never given
cause to doubt his loyalty to the Republic, says that the
leader of the Catholic Popular Action party had accepted the
Republic as legally constituted, and was convinced that it was
possible to build within its framework a constitution quite
satisfactory to Catholics. 2
The election of November 19 resulted in an over-
whelming defeat for the Socialists and the Center parties. The
triumphant Right confederation of the Church, the landlords,
the merchants and the manufacturers made immediate prepara-
tions to put into effect its program which called for the
revision of the Constitution, the repeal of agrarian reform.
the abrogation of anti- clerical legislation, and the limitation
of the power of labor.
5
The results of the election were as follows:^
Right group s
Catholic Popular Action
Agrarians (landed Interests)
Basque Nationalists
Navarrese, Traditionalists,
and Monarchists
Independents
67
86
14
43
2 207
i. Ibid .
,
p. 280. 2. Ibid., p. 145.
3* Foreign Policy Bulletin , November 24, 1933.
4. de Madariaga, op. cit.
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Center groups
Radicals 104
Conservatives lb
Conservative Catalan Home-Rulers 25
Liberal Democrats 9
Progressives 3
Independents 8 161
Left groups
Socialists 5b
C ommuni st s 1
Radical Socialists 5
Accion Republicana (Azana) 5
O.R.G.A. (Gallegan Left) 6
asquerra (Catalan Left) 19
Federalists 2 9b
Lerroux, asked by President Aleala Zamora to organ-
ize a cabinet of members of the Right and Center parties, was
extremely cautious in making his selections and ended by
balancing one member from the Right coalition with one member
of the Left- -a Gallegan Home-Ruler. Spain was to be ruled by
a Center ministry dependent upon the Right, which controlled
a majority of the seats in the Cortes. 1
Forced to resign on March 1, Lerroux returned to
power two days later, only to bring back with him practically
the same ministry as before. 2 Spain continued to be governed
by a Center cabinet- -hence by a party which was in the minority
It was not surprising to rind this situation extremely unsat-
isfactory to the Right coalition, and no more satisfactory to
the Left.
But, although they would much prefer to see Lerroux
in power than Gil Robles, the Socialists and other Left parties
1. Ibid., p. 324.
2. Foreign Policy Bulletin
, March 9, 1934.
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were strongly opposed to any modification of the anti- clerical
and the labor legislation passed during the Azana administration.
Apprehensive lest the President be forced to do the natural
thing and call in Gil Robles, leader of the majority coalition,
the chief of the extremists within the Socialist party, rran-
cisco Largo Caballero, repeatedly threatened to oppose any
"aggression" from the Right with a violent revolution and a
dictatorship or the proletariat.
1
During this period of crisis, President Aleala Zam-
ora persisted in his efforts to keep Gil Robles from the posi-
tion of power to which, under the parliamentary system, he was
entitled. In the spring of 1934, when he should have called
for a coalition or the Gil Robles-Lerroux forces, the President
named as Premier, Ricardo Samper, an insignificant member of
Lerroux's Radical party, whose administration was to prove
even less satisfactory to both extremes than had its predeces-
2
sor.
~
The chances for the continuance of constitutional
government became less promising as the summer of 1934 wore
on. There was increasing evidence that, behind the scenes,
extreme reactionary and extreme revolutionary groups were pre-
paring for a clash of arms.
The crisis came soon after the Catalan Generalitat
was permitted to enact a law by which peasants were granted
1. Foreign Policy Bulletin, March 9, 1934.
2. Foreign Policy Bulletin
, September 28, 1934.
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small holdings of land at the expense of the big landowners,
and Premier Samper was vehemently denounced by Gil Robles for
his lack of firmness in dealing with the Catalan leader, Luis
Companys. This growing impatience of the Right groups brought
about the fall of Samper, and, on October 4, Alejandro Lerroux,
for the first time in the history of the new Republic, formed
a cabinet composed entirely of members of conservative groups.
Radicals and right-wing republicans were in the majority, but
the cabinet also included three members of Gil Robles' Catholic
Popular Action party.
2
2.
The Revolution of 1934 .
Largo Caballero's bluff had been called on October
4. During the next two days, a revolt broke out in Oviedo,
Madrid, and Barcelona. On October 5, an attempt was made to
call a general strike throughout the nation. ^ The next day,
Luis Companys denounced the "monarchizlng and Fascist forces"
seeking to betray the Republic and proclaimed the independence
of the Catalan Republic.
4
The Catalan revolt was crushed within 12 hours, and
the rebellion in Asturias was put down only after an orgy of
merciless torture and slaughter, of which Peers says?
"Of no event that had yet occurred during
the life of the Republic were related stories
more terrible, and more incredible, on both
sides, of cold-blooded torture and murder,
mutilation, wanton destruction. . . . "5
1. Foreign Policy Bulletin , September 2b, 1934.
2. Foreign Policy Bulletin
,
October 12, 1934.
3. Peers, op. clt . t p. 164.
4. Foreign Policy Bulletin
,
October 12, 1934.
5. Piers, op. clt ., p. ibb-169.
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De Madariaga, in commenting on the events which
brought about the uprising of 1934, says:
"The revolt of 1934 is unpardonable, ihe
decision of the President in calling the C.E.D.A.
,
the Catholic Popular Action party to share in the
Government was not only unimpeachable, not only
unavoidable, but long overdue. The argument that
Senor Gil Robles intended to bring in Fascism
was both hypocritical and demonstrably untrue.
It was hypocritical because everybody knew that
the Socialists of Senor Largo Caballero were
dragging the other Socialists to a rebellion
against the Republic of 1931 quite apart from
Senor Gil Robles and in the teeth of Azana's
opposition to such a desperate course; demon-
strably untrue because, had Senor Gil nobles
meant to destroy the Constitution by violent
means, the defeat of the rebellion of 1934
gave him a golden opportunity to do so--and he
did not take it. . . . With the rebellion of
1934, the Left lost every shred to moral auth-
ority to condemn the rebellion of I936 ."-1-
The author quoted above adds the interesting ob-
servation that the coalition of clericals and conservatives,
the government alleged to be a deadly threat to the liberties
of Spain, did not take the life of a single leader of the
revolt. 2
3 . The Republic to February 1936
When the Lerroux ministry collapsed on May 3, 1935,
Gil Robles had every right to expect that his time to assume
leadership of the Government had finally come. But President
Aleala Zamora again thwarted the head of the Catholic Popular
Action party, by asking Lerroux to succeed himself. However,
when the new ministry was formed, the C.E.D.A. did manage to
1. Ibid ., p. 332-333- 2. Ibid ., p. 334.
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I secure five cabinet posts, including the War Office which was
taken over by Gil Robles himself. 1
During this administration, the aim of the conserva-
tive elements was to amend the articles in the Constitution
concerning the powers of the President, the second chamber,
expropriation powers of the Cortes, religious matters, divorce,
and home- rule.
The Lerroux government fell again on September 2p,
and Jacquin Chapaprieto formed a ministry which was to last
until the conservative groups blocked the Premier’s attempt to
increase slightly the tax on the moneyed interests three
months later. 2
After making several attempts to form a government
which would satisfy all parties, President Aleala Zamora
named an ex-Monarchist and now Center politician, Portela
Valladares, as Premier. On January 7, 1936, the new Premier •
was granted the degree dissolving the Cortes, and the political
stage was set for the holding of another general election.
5
4. The Election of February 1936
In the less than five years of its existence, from
April of 1931 to January of 1936, the Republic had failed to
bring political stability to Spain. The presence of more than
18 party hats in the political ring of that country might go a
long way towards explaining the rise and fall, during this
1. de Madariaga, op. cit .. p. 336 .
2. Ibid., p. 339. 3. Ibid*, P* 339*
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brief period, of 2b cabinets composed of 90 different ministers.
1
A month before the February election, the Monarchist,
Catholic Popular Action, conservative and right-wing republican
deputies in the Cortes, finally took action against the Presi-
dent. A petition was drawn up and circulated in an attempt to
obtain the required number of signatures necessary in order to
bring impeachment proceedings against Aleala Zamora, who was
charged with refusing to offer the Premiership to Robles and
the Catholic Popular Actionists, and with suspending parlia-
mentary sessions for 45 days while the Constitution limited
such suspension to 15 days.-
In the meanwhile, Alejandro Lerroux had been moving
the conservative elements under his leadership farther and
farther to the Right, until, on February 2, he declared in a
speech at Barcelona:
"It is true I was considered Spain's most
dangerous revolutionary in the time of the
monarchy, but you find me in conservative com-
pany now because Spain today is threatened with
a revolutionary menace that will destroy her
culture, social order and civilization by re-
placing the republic with a communist state that
takes orders from Moscow."^
The issues in the campaign of February, 1936, were
clear-cut. it was a fight between Azaha and G-ll Robles, be-
tween the Left and the Right. All the parties of the Left, in-
cluding the left wing of the Radical Party, led by Martinez
1. New York Times
, January 2, 1936, p. 11.
2. New York Times
,
January 3, 1936, p. 11.
3. New York Times , February 3, 1936, p. 13*
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Barrio, formed a Popular Front coalition in a pact which was
published on January 15, 1936. The parties of the Right allied
themselves in an anti-Marxist front.
^
The results of the general election of February lp
showed a complete victory for the Popular Front:
~
Popular Front
Votes
4,206,156
Deputies
256
Center 681,047 62
Right 5,783,601 132
But, according to the figures presented by de Madari
aga, although the Left had beaten the Right, the Center Left
had beaten the extreme Left:
3
Votes Deputies
Left Center ( Azana)
socialists and
2,413,200 148
Communists 1,793,000 no
In pointing to the fact that gfat one in every three
within the Marxist group was in favor of an immediate social
revolution, de Madariaga says that Spain declared herself, in
this election, to be: 21
1. - By two to one against Marxism;
2. - By two to one against Clericals and Militarists;
3. - By eight to one against a Socialist revolution;
4. - Almost unanimously against a military revolu-
tion.
D. The Republic - February 1936 to July 1936
The news of the Popular Front’s victory was greeted
with mass demonstrations, riots, and prison and Jail breaks.
1. De Madariaga, op. cit., p. 339.
2. Ibid., p. 340.
3. Ibid., p. 341.
4. Ibid., p. 343.
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As the demands of amnesty for all political prisoners Increased,
the situation grew worse until martial law was declared in
some cities. 1
On February 19, Premier Portela Valladares and his
cabinet resigned, and Manuel Azana was asked to form a ministry.
Since the Socialists refused to share power, hence responsi-
bility, Azafta's cabinet was composed of members of his own
Republican Action party, and two members of Martinez Barrios'
Republican Union party. 2
After Azana had pleaded for order, a general amnesty
was decreed in Spain, freeing all persons convicted of or a-
waiting trial for political and social offenses. The release
of political prisoners only served to increase the wave of
lawlessness sweeping the country. Peers says of these riots:
"The best that can be said about the riots
that took pice during the months following the
General Election is that they seem nearly all
to have been spontaneous, unorganized acts of
hooliganism, due to the return of exiled extrem-
ists and to the ebullition of feeling at the
return to power of the Left after a period of
eclipse. . .
Soon after Azafia resumed power, it became increasing-
ly evident that he would either have to depend upon the sup-
port of the 89 Socialists and the 14 Communists in the Cortes,
or ally himself with the Center and the more conservative re-
publican groups. Francisco Largo Caballero was reported by
1. New York Times, February 20, 1936, p. 9 .
2. Ibid .
3* New York Times
.
February 22, 1936, p. 1.
4. Peers, op. clt ., p. 194.
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William P. Carney as saying, before the election, that a vic-
tory for the Socialists and their liberal but capitalist allies
would be only a stepping stone to a Soviet regime in Spain
similar to that in Russia. 1 One week later, the same corres-
pondent stated that while Azana’s policy showed that the new
regime was willing to compromise with the Marxists, if such a
course was not possible, the Premier would ruthlessly suppress
the extreme Left as he did when previously in power.
2
The breach between the Left and the Right was even
wider by the end of March, when all but 40 of the more than
200 Center and Right deputies- elect withdrew from the Cortes
in protest against an order which made invalid the election
of Rightists in Granada and other constituencies.-^ The 160
deputies returned to their seats a few days later when the
Premier, in reassuring the conservatives that there was no
A
real danger of communism in Spain, pleaded for their support.
On May 10, when Azana was elected President by the
Cortes, he offered to matfe Indalecio Prieto, leader of the
moderate Socialists, his Premier. 5 But when the Largo Cabal-
lero extremists were violently opposed to any active Socialist
participation in the Government, the new President named Sant-
iago Cesares Quiroga, one of his closest friends and Minister
of Interior during the attempted revolt of 1932, as the man to
form a ministry.
1« New York Times
,
March lb, 1956, p. E-7.
2. New York Times
,
March 22, 1936, p. E-7«
3« New York Times , April 1, 1936, p. 18.
4. New York Times
, April 4, 1936, p. 7*
5. mew York Times , May 17, 1956, p. E-4.
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Gil Robles, speaking before the Cortes on June 16,
condemned the Government for its failure to take strong action
against the wave of violence and crime which was destroying
law and order in the Republic. Gil Robles presented statistics
which showed that, since the February election, 340 strikes had
been called, 269 persons had been killed in disorders, 160
churches had been completely burned, and 251 Catholic temples,
convents, and school buildings partly destroyed. 1
Brenan is of the opinion that practically all of the
churches burned during this period were burned by Anarchists
and that most of the priests were killed by them, 2 while
Peers says of the failure of the Government to take strong
action:
"It was unfortunate that the first targets
of popular violence should have been churches,
for the inactivity of the forces of law and
order in suppressing the outbreaks was inter-
preted, at least by implication, as pointing to
a new period of official anti-clerical policy.
As a matter of fact, it seems to have been due
rather to a desire not to excite mob feeling and
to the hope that, if left alone, it would in the
course of a few weeks die a normal death. "3
As the summer of 1936 approached, the Popular Front
government, menaced from the Right and from the Left, tried
desperately to fulfill its tasks, but with slight hope of suc-
cess. But, though some of the troubles of the Spanish Repub-
lic in the early summer of 1936 were the result of developments
1. New York Times
, June 21, 1936, p. E-5*
2. Ibid., p. 189. 3. Ibid., p. 194
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stemming from the February election, the real causes for the
failure of the Republic to bring order out of chaos were much
deeper. De Madariaga, in tracing some of these causes back to
1931, says:
”... Azafia was unable to conquer his aversion
towards Lerroux. . . Even as a big river can be
traced to a slender brook, so the Spanish Civil
War may be said to begin on that day when Azafla
made up his mind that he could not go hand in
hand with the Radical party. ”1
Of the split within the Spanish Socialist party which
contributed to the insurmountable obstacles the young Republic
met on the road to democracy, de Madariaga declares:
"Needless to say, a Marxist political
formation might and should have been one of the
most solid foundations of the Republic; but the
Spanish Socialist party was deeply divided. Two
of its three leaders, Prieto and Besteiro, were
for an evolutionary policy in cordial collabora-
tion with the progressive and genuine liberals
who followed Azana. The third, however, Largo
Caballero, had thrown to the winds the political
wisdom of a lifetime, and, sowing his political
wild oats at the time when people quietly eat
the tasteless porridge of experience, he was
leading the fiery socialist youth movement to-
wards the proletarian revolution. 1,2
But despite Largo Caballero's threat of violent revo-
lution and a dictatorship of the proletariat, it would have
been impossible, in the summer of 193b, for the socialist ex-
tremists to successfully make their revolution against the com-
bined forces of the Civil Guard and the Army. Brenan, in ad-
vancing this theory, maintains:
1. Ibid ., p. 297.
2. Ibid., p. 294.
.V V
jf
. o: i i "10
-
<
,
'
, . .
, .
,
.
t
<
.
!
•
‘
,
,
-
.
*
"There was really only one chance of
Caballero’s attaining power and that was that
the generals should rise, that the Government
should distribute arms to the people and that
the people should win. Consciously or un-
consciously, he and his party were gambling on
there being a military insurrection. 1,1
Largo Caballero’s chances for putting his threatened
revolution across were even more remote after July 1. On that
day, the moderate faction of the Socialist party, led by In-
dalecio Prieto, scored a major triumph over the revolutionary
element. Ramon Gonzales Pefia, a close friend of Prieto and a
moderate, was elected president of the new executive committee.
This event, plus the fact that 54 of' the 100 Socialist deputies
in the Cortes now followed the lead of Prieto, while 46 took
orders from Largo Caballero, meant to the New York Times that,
from July 1 on, the moderate Socialists would, in all proba-
bility, have much more to say about the policy of the party
than they had in the past.^
But the Republic was being threatened from the Right
as well as from the Left, by Fascism as well as by the Cabal-
lero brand of Socialism.
The Spanish Falange, founded in 1932 by Jose Antonio
Primo de Rivera, son of the dictator, merged with other small
Fascist groups two years later. Until after the elctions of
February 1936, the party, whose membership was composed pri-
marily of university students, was very small and was ignored
1. Ibid., p. 395.
2. New York Times
.
July 2, 1936, p. 12.
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and even disliked by the Church and the landlords. 1 in the
February election, the Fascists polled only 5,000 votes in
Madrid, but soon afterward many of Gil Robles' supporters
deserted him to put their trust in either the Monarchists, led
by Calvo Sotelo, or in the Falange. In April 1936, the Gil
Robles' Youth Organization, under the lead of its secretary,
Serrano Suher, merged with the Falange, which proceeded to
match the Anarchists and other Left extremists in acts of ter-
ror and assassination throughout the spring and summer.
2
Peers discusses Fascism in Spain in the following
passages:
"Spanish Fascism was, of course, a very
different proposition in 1936 from anything
that it had been during previous governments.
Then it was an almost academic party-- Just one
group among many which could be counted on to
support the Right in the Cortes. . . . had the
Right been successful in the February elections.
Fascism would no doubt have continued to develop
within it, but it would have developed slowly. . . .
But when the Popular Front came into power in
February 1936, there set in a reactionary move-
ment not at all unlike the movement in the oppo-
site direction which had begun after the victory
of the Centre two years earlier. The majority
of the Right-wing groups were content to abide
the consequences of the electorate's decision
and to go into opposition until their turn came
at last for power. But the Fascists were not. "5
By mid-July, it was evident that the struggle of the
Center to keep the two extremes from tearing the Spanish Re-
public asunder had been in vain. Behind the din of Fascist-
1. Brenan, op. clt .. p. 308.
2 . Ibid
.
,
p. 309
•
3. Ibid ., p. 206-207.
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Socialist street fighting and behind the terror of assassina-
tion, forces were at work within and outside the Cortes, con-
spiring against the Republic. Brenan maintains that the
Monarchists had never ceased plotting against the Republic
since 1931, and that their leader, Antonio Golcoechea, had been
communicating secretly with the Italian Government since 1933*
This author also is convinced that Calvo Sotelo had worked for
a rebellion, had served as a link between Army officers,
Falangists, and conservatives, and had done his utmost to pre-
vent any reconciliation between the Catholic Popular Actionlsts
and the Azana Republicans. 1
The U.M.E. - Union Militar Espanola — a secret
society of Army officers were also actively plotting against
the Government. Brenan says that the preparations for a
military rising were far advanced by July 1936, and that the
U.M.E. had been in contact with both Germany and Italy for
months.
2
On July 12 came the climax. Lieutenant Castillo, a
leader of shock troops and a Communist- sympathizer who had been
particularly effective in combating violence from the Right,
was assassinated by Fascists. On the same night, Calvo Sotelo
was kidnapped from his home, slain, and delivered to a cemetery.
Four days later, on July 16, 1936, the Army revolted
at Tetuan, in Spanish Morocco. The Spanish Civil War had begun.
3
1. Ibid .
, p. 311.
2. Brenan, op. clt
., p. 3 10.
3. De madariaga, op. clt ., p. 331 .
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CHAPTER III
CIVIL WAR
Since a military history of the Spanish Civil War
has no place in this study, events of a military nature will
be referred to in this chapter only as they have a direct bear-
ing on the political, and some of the more important social and
economic developments which took place within Spain during the
tragic years, 1936-1939.
A. The Last Days of the Republic
1. Behind the Outbreak
Although it was the Right and not the Left which
struck the first blow against the Spanish Republic on July 16,
1936, the Government Itself, as well as the Left, must accept
its share of direct and immediate responsibility for the out-
break of the conflict.
When the Government refused to allow a public debate
on the Sotelo murder and adjourned the Cortes, parliamentary
procedures came to an end, for the conservative opposition an-
nounced their permanent withdrawal from the Cortes. 1 This
crisis provided the military extemists with just the opportun-
ity they had been waiting for.
The Left must shoulder its share of the blame for
July 16, the fateful day which marked the beginning of the end
1. Foreign Policy Bulletin
.
July 31, 1936.
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for the Spanish Republic. If the Socialists and other extrem-
ists had not persisted in their stubborn and disastrous policy
of refusing to share power and responsibility with the Left
Republicans after the Popular Front victory, constitutional
government would have had a chance in Spain. But, deprived of
the support of those who had shared in the election triumph of
February, the Azana and Q,uiroga ministries were helpless when
confronted by a series of paralyzing strikes, called by Syndi-
calists, Communists, and Caballero Socialists, which crippled
the economic life of the nation.
However, in all fairness, some consideration must be
given to the argument of J. Alvarez del Vayo, who maintains
that many of these strikes— 145 new ones were called in the
month beginning June 16 1— were provoked by the series of lock-
outs declared by industrialists of Fascist sympathies. 2
Many militarists sincerely believed that the tactics
of the extreme Left constituted part of a deliberate plan to
"wreck” constitutional government and prepare the way for the
establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. But there
were others who had plans of their own.
There seems to be little doubt that the military
revolt had been planned for some time before the actual begin-
ning of hostilities. Del Vayo quotes ex-Premier Portela Val-
ladares as stating in 1937:
1. Foreign Policy Bulleti n. July 31* 1936.
2. Ibid ., p. 16 .
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11At four in the morning on the day after the
elections, I was visited by Senor Gil Robles who
proposed that I should assume dictatorial powers,
and who offered me the support of all the groups
defeated in the elections. At seven that even-
ing the same suggestion was made to me by General
Francisco Franco himself." 1
Brenan, in referring to this allegation by Portela
Valladares, an ex-Monarchist who had never strayed further to
the Left than the Center, declares that these proposals from
the Right constituted the real reason why the Premier resigned
suddenly on February 19, without even waiting for the assembly
of the new Cortes. 2
In the opinion of Lawrence A. Fernsworth, although
the privileged classes, the Army, and the Church all knew that
a revolt from the Right would throw the door wide open to the
violent social revolution of the extreme Left, these forces of
reaction--in order to salvage their own material interests
—
willingly provided the spark which started the conflagration
that destroyed the Republic and made the cause of democracy a
hopelessly lost one no matter which faction emerged triumphant.
Although he concedes that both Russian Communism and
German-I talian Fascism had shown considerable interest in the
Spanish Civil War before it actually started, de Madariaga, in
taking the position that neither Russian nor the Fascist States
were responsible for the outbreak of the conflict says:
1 . Ibid
. ,
p . 6
.
2. Ibid
.
,
p. 301.
3» Foreign Affairs
.
October 1936, p. 101.
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. . . it is a fact that the actual outbreak
was the combined effect of two typically Spanish
pronunciamentos: that of Don Francisco Largo Ca-
ballero, Commander-in-Chief of the revolutionary
wing of the General Union of Workers (U.G.T.),
which was not Communist, and that of Don Fran-
cisco Franco, Commander-in-Chief of the rebel-
lious General Union of Officers (U.M.E. ), which
was not Fascist. In July 1936 these two men
incarnated the Spanish tradition of violent
interference in internal affairs. We are to
see that Azafta, belatedly, thought of incarna-
ting the other Spanish tradition, that of
reasonable compromise and mutual understanding
so admirably cultivated in Spain by Don Fran-
cisco Giner. In this battle of the three
Franciscos, the true, the great, the creative
Francisco, the hope of Spain, was crushed out of
action by the other two. . . .’*1
2. The Conflict-- July to September 1936
On July 18, the cabinet of Premier Santiago Cesares
Quiroga resigned, and Martinez Barrio, speaker of the Cortes
and leader of the Republican Union, organized a new ministry
with himself as Premier. Within three hours of its assuming
power, the Barrio government fell, and President Azafla called
o
upon Jose Giral to form a cabinet.
When Giral assumed leadership of the embattled Re-
public, one of the first acts of the new regime was to issue
weapons to 50,000 Marxist militiamen.^ The author of "Spain"
gives the following account of the first days of the Republic’s
struggle:
1. Ibid., p. 367.
2. iMew ->-ork Times
.
July 19, 1936, p. 1.
3. Foreign Policy Bulletins
,
July 31, 1936.
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"On the Republican side, the Giral cabinet
ceased to count the moment it handed weapons
over to the Unions. The ministers lived the
first days of the war inside the Ministry of
the Navy, barricaded against their own follow-
ers. The country gave itself over to the two
ruling passions of the Spaniards: dictatorship
and separatism. Every region, town, province
and village had its own government; every work-
ing class organization also. Some attention
was paid to the Civil War, but more to the
proletarian revolution. 11 1
The proletarian revolution made considerable headway
after the wholesale arming of the masses which took place dur-
ing the first days of the conflict. In Catalonia, the National
Confederation of Labour (C.N.T.)-- headed by Anarchists and
Syndicalists, immediately organized for the social revolution,
and began a campaign of slaying prominent persons, razing
churches and convents, and destroying all land registration
offices . 2
Forced to rely upon the support of the great mass of
workers and peasants, the G-lral administration, through vari-
ous decrees, began to put into effect its own radical reform
program. On July 28, a decree was Issued by the Ministry of
Education which authorized all governors and mayors of every
province and city of Spain to confiscate all buildings and
teaching equipment belonging to religious orders.-5 This decree
ordered the enforcement of Article 26 of the Constitution of
1931. Two days later, the entire Spanish merchant fleet was
confiscated and placed at the disposal of the Navy.^
1. Ibid . ,~pT~374.
2. De Madariaga, op . c 1
t
.
,
p. 375*
3. New York Times , July 29, 1936, p. 1.
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On August 1, all electrical concerns and two broad-
casting stations were seized, and on August 3, the munitions
and aviation industries were nationalized, while special com-
mittees were established to control the Madrid banks; Marxist
militiamen were exempted from paying rent; and a 40-hour week
and 15 percent wage increase were put into effect.
1
3. The Insurgents
A military dictatorship which had little to do with
Fascism had complete charge of the rebellion during the first
three months of the Civil War. The Governing Junta, set up by
General Cabanellas and including five generals and two colonels,
had practically complete control of the Army, the Civil Guard,
the Moorish troops, and the Foreign Legion, while the Govern-
ment had no regular troops and few regular officers.- General
Sanjurjo, who had led the attempted Army coup in 1932, was
originally scheduled to head the Insurgent forces, but was
killed in an air crash while en route to take command from
Lisbon.
Among the first steps taken by the Rebels in the
territories controlled by them were the suspension of agrarian
reform, the return of rural property to landlords, and the re-
turn of compulsory religious instruction to the schools.
^
According to de Madariaga, it was not until October
1. Foreign Policy Bulletin
.
August 7, 1936.
2. De Madariaga, op. clt .
,
p. 372-373-
3* Foreign Policy Bulletin
,
January 22, 1937-
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1, 1936, when General Francisco Franco became Generalissimo of
the Insurgent forces, that the Spanish military revolt began to
take on the appearance of a Fascist foreign inspired movement.
1
On April 19, 1937, General Franco established a sin-
gle party under his leadership, and ordered the dissolution of
all other political groups and militia organizations. This
decree did away with the Catholic Popular Action party of Gil
Robles, with the Phalanx, as it had been organized by Jose
Antonio Primo de Rivera, and with two Monarchist parties. The
new party adopted the 26-point program of the Fascists as its
p
platform.
Rather than dominate the Spanish Falange through
suppression, General Franco elected to put himself at its head.
On August 4, 1937, all officers and non-commissioned officers
in the Insurgent army became members of the reorganized Fal-
ange. 5 On October 21, the Insurgents announced the estab-
lishment of a Fascist National Council, in which the Carlist
Monarchists and the Falange were represented along with the
military commanders.^ In January 1933, Ramon Serrano Sufter,
brother-in-law of Franco and leading spokesman for Nazi-Fas-
cisra in Spain, was charged with the political reorganization
of the new party.-
1. Ibid., p. 373.
2. Foreign Policy Bulleti n. April 39, 1937*
3 . De Madariaga, op. clt .
,
p. 398.
4. Foreign Policy Bulletin
.
November 5, 1937*
5. De Madariaga, op. cltTT p. 398.
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B. Rebels and Revolutionists
The rapid advances of the Insurgent forces during the
early weeks of the conflict brought about the fall of the
G-iral government, and, on September 4, Francisco Largo Cabal-
lero formed the Republic's fourth war-time ministry. The new
cabinet, which for the first time was composed of nearly all
the groups that had shared in the Popular Front victory of
February, included six Socialists, two Communists, one Basque
Nationalist, one Catalan Leftist, one Republican Unionist, and
two Left Republicans.
1
De Madariaga maintains that on this day, the day that
Caballero assumed power, the Republic met its death, and the
pCivil War became a struggle between rebels and revolutionists.
On November 4, when four of their representatives
were taken into the cabinet, the Anarcho-Syndicalists parti-
cipated in the Popular Front government for the first time.^
After Largo Caballero had submitted the resignation
of his cabinet on May 15, 1937, he was immediately charged by
President Azana with the responsibility of organizing and
heading a new government.^ However, when the Premier ran into
considerable difficulty in reassembling a ministry which would
satisfy all parties, Azana gave the task to Dr. Juan ^egrin, a
Socialist and former Finance Minister. t*argo Caballero and
1. New York Times, September 5, 1936. p. 1.
2. Tbld .
.
p. 3327
3. New York Times , November 5, 1936, p. 22.
4. New York Times, May 16, 1937, p* 1*
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J. Alvarez del Vayo were excluded from the new governing body
which included two Communists, three Socialists, two Left re-
publicans, one Republican Unionist, and one Basque Nationalist
.
1
In noting this move by the Loyalist Government, Her-
bert L. Matthews said in a New York Times article:
"Dr. Negrin’ s success in forming the Cabinet
represented a victory for his view that power
ought to be concentrated in a strong and relative-
ly liberal central government representing the
middle as well as the working classes in order to
direct the Loyalist cause more efficiently. *2
But de Madariaga goes behind the headlines in search
of the real reasons for the cabinet change of May 17:
"It may still be found on closer scrutiny
that in ousting Senor Largo Caballero, the
Communists, both Russian and Spanish were the
only actors who knew the script of the whole play,
while Don Indalecio Prieto and Dr. Negrin knew
little more than some cues and the hard fact that
they were getting rid of their rival in the
Socialist party. That in the mind of Dr. Negrin
the new cabinet meant a move to the Right, to
authority, order and centralization was obvious.
He gave the Foreign Office to Senor Giral, a
friend of President Azana, with the hope either
of conquering British and French opinion or of'
initiating some peace move or both. "5
The ousting of Largo Caballero and the Anarchists re-
sulted in a serious split within the ranks of the Left. Both
the leader of the U.G.T. and Andres Nin, leader of the P.O.U.M.
(extreme Communist faction) considered the Negrin regime as
bourgeoise, and were determined to fight its policy which ap-
parently was one of concentrating on the winning of the war
1. New York Times
, May 13,
2. Ibid .
3. Ibid ., p. 397.
1937, p. 15.
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and letting the proletarian revolution slip into the background
Charles A. Thomson attributed much oi the friction
among the Loyalists to the increasing strength of the Commun-
ist party, which from the outbreak of war to the autumn of
1937 had grown from 50,000 to 400,000 members. According to
this writer, the Communists had made a successful attempt to
win the support of the small farmers and business men, by unk-
ing the best of a policy of moderation toward socialization of
industry and agriculture.
2
On October 1, 1937, when the Cortes met at Valencia,
the Negrin government received the confidence of not only a
majority of the Socialist deputies, the Communists, and the
Left Republicans, but also of Miguel Maura and ex-Premier
Portela Valladares, leaders of the two Center parties who re-
sumed their seats in the Cortes.-^
In March 1938, Charles A. Thomson reported that the
rising power and influence of Indaleeio Prieto, at this time
Minister of National Defense, together with the curbing of
Communist influence in the Army, the strengthening of the Cen-
ter and middle class groups in the Cortes, and the increasing
tendency on the part of the authorities to permit private re-
ligious services, all indicated a noticeable drift toward mod-
eration. ^
1. New York Times
.
August 10, 1937, p. 1.
2. Foreign Policy Bulletin, November 5. 1937*
3. Ibid .
4. Foreign Policy Bulletin
. March 11, 1938.
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C. The Triumph of Reaction
In spite of the defeat of the Revolutionary Govern-
ment in Catalonia and the occupation of Barcelona on January
26, 1939, Premier Negrin was determined to continue the strug-
gle to the end. On February 1, before a skeleton meeting or
the Cortes, Negrin laid down as the conditions for peace: a
guarantee of Spanish independence from foreign influence; a
plebiscite to determine the form of government desired by
the people; liquidation of the Civil War without persecution,
and freedom for all Spaniards to Join in the country's recon-
struction. ^
On February 21, President Azana, now in Paris, ex-
pressed the opinion that all further resistance would be use-
less. Seven days later, he resigned after being informed that,
on February 27, Great Britain and France had recognized the
Insurgents. With Azafia in Paris at this time were President
Aguirre of the Basque Government, President Companys of the
Catalan Republic, and Martinez Barrio, President of the Cortes.^
A National Defense Council replaced the Negrin cabi-
net on March 5* General Jose Miaja was elected as its Presi-
dent, while Colonel Sigismundo Casado, a key figure in the
coup d'etat, which ousted Negrin, became Minister of Defense.
On March 7, the Communists, who were not represented on the
Council, revolted in a movement which was suppressed six days
later.
1 .
2 .
Foreign Policy Bulletin
, February 17,
De Madariaga, op. cl t.
.
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Peace negotiations were carried on from March 13-19,
only to be abruptly broken off by the Rebels who promptly
launched a new offensive. But on March 26, the Insurgents re-
opened negotiations by broadcasting their conditions of peace,
which sounded reasonable enough for the officers of the Loyal-
ist Army to disband their units. 1
By April 1, 1939, the bloody civil strife had offici-
ally been brought to a close. During the first few months of
the war, the youngest of Europe's republics had been destroyed.
The assassins, the extremists of the Right and the extremists
of the Left, then became locked in a fierce struggle over the
dead body of Spanish democracy, until, after two and one-half
years which knew neither mercy nor compassion, the forces or
reaction were to triumph over the forces of revolution, some
of the reasons for the victory of the Right over the Left--
and Center-r-in Spain will be included in the chapters immedi-
ately following.
1. De Madariaga, op. cit .
,
p. 413.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CHURCH AND THE WAR
It was pointed out in Chapter I that since the
hierarchy, the orders, and the clergy have exerted a tremendous
Influence over the political, economic, and social Institutions
of Spain during the past century, the Spanish Church must
share responsibility for the pre-conditions which made the
Revolution of 1931 inevitable. On the other hand, as was seen
in Chapter II, the v iolent anti- clericalism of the Spanish
masses and the anti-clerical measures taken by the Government
during the five years of the Republic were important factors
contributing to the Counter-Revolution of 193b.
During the Civil War, the Spanish Church, the Vatican
and the Roman Catholic hierarchy throughout the world adopted
an attitude and took certain steps which have been bitterly
attacked in some circles and staunchly defended in others. An
attempt will be made in Chapter IV to determine the reasons why
and the extent to which the Spanish Church participated in the
war, and the extent to which the Vatican and the hierarchy
were responsible for turning public opinion against the Loyal-
ist Government and in favor of the Insurgents.
A. The War and the Spanish Church
When the Army, the Civil Guard, the Foreign Legion,
and most of the law enforcers threw in their lot with the In-
surgents after July 16, 1936, and the Giral ministry, with no
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adequate means by which to cope with the serious crisis, was
forced to arm the peasants and the workers, the undisciplined
Spanish masses turned against all that they could associate
with a past of oppression and exploitation. Unfortunately, the
storm of violent passions fell most heavily upon churches, con-
vents, temples, and schools which went up in flames throughout
the country, and upon priests, monks, and even nuns who were
slain in the streets.
Was this terrible fury, unleashed by the outbreak of
the conflict, deliberately inspired by the Loyalist Government,
by the Communists, or was it, as Reinhold Niebuhr has said, the
result of a terrible increment of vengeance piling up for years
in the soul of the Spanish peasant? 1
Indalecio Prieto, admitting these outrages committed
against the Church and the clergy, during an interview in New
York in December 1938, said in defense of the Loyalist cause:
"In truth I cannot nor do I wish to deny
that at the beginning of the military uprising
there were deplorable excesses on our side. But
what I do deny is that such excesses have been at
any time ordered or inspired by the Government.
In fact, they were quickly ended as soon as the
Government, which most of the army and police had
deserted, was able to assert its authority." 2
But, even before the outbreak of the Civil War, as
Church properties were being destroyed by violence, the Church
was becoming implicated in the plot against the Republic.
Richard Neville maintains that it was common knowledge in Spain
1. The Christian Century
.
September 2, 1936, p. 11^8.
2. New York Times
.
December 12, 1938, p. 10.
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that the outlawed Falange kept Its membership intact and met
secretly in Church properties until it came out into the open
on July 13. 1
Less than a month after the outbreak or the Civil
War, in the August 7> 1936 edition or The Catholic Herald , of
London, the following view was expressed concerning the rebel-
lion in Spain:
11
. . . Yet the anti- communist dictator-
ships, and they alone, present a military shield
against communist dictatorships, both in their
own countries and for Christendom as a whole. . .
if we are speaking of all that shows itself above
ground, being neither of the inner life nor of
the catacombs, then armed protection, open or
disguised, always has been and always must be
necessary to ensure its safety against violent
enemies. . . . " 2
In regard to such an attitude as that expressed above
Donald Atwater, prominent English Catholic journalist, said
that the grave danger is that religious people allow themselves
to be thrown by Communist violence and success into the arms
of opposite parties in which Christians should not be found.
Atwater went on to give the following account of Church parti-
cipation in the Spanish struggle:
"... Processions of Our Lady accompanied
by men triumphantly waving rifles, and 1 anti-
Red’ militia whose uniform includes a badge of
the Sacred Heart, churches used as arsenals by
anti-Communist troops (all reported recently
from Spain, the last by a well-known Italian
Catholic)— these are the sort of thing that
give color to Communist charges against Christ-
ianity that confirm the belief that Catholics
will stick at nothing to down Communism and up-
1. The New Republic
.
Sept. 16, 1936, p. 147.
2. The Catholic World
.
October 1936, pp. 101-102.
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hold flagrantly unjust social and economic sys-
tems and the material possessions of the Church.
Richard Neville describes the activities of the
clergy in Granada in support of the forces of rebellion:
“I know because I saw them, that in Grana-
da’s church towers and steeples machine guns
were placed and that they were used against a
civilian population. ... I know again because
I saw it with my own eyes that the churches of
Granada were used as barracks for the fascist
organizations and the rebel militia and I know
that in at least one church in Granada--the
Church of San Geronimo--considerable ammunition
was stored. . . . The Archbishop at Granada had
blessed companies of the Civil Guard being sent
out to ’pacify’ rebellious villages and the
Cardinal at Seville has put his stamp of approval
on the revolt by presiding at a mass in the
presence of General Franco. . . . *' 2
That churches were being used not as churches but
as Fascist fortresses, was the official explanation of the
Loyalist Government when it decreed, on July 28, 1936, the en-
forcement of Article 26 of the Constitution of 1931, which
ordered all buildings belonging to religious orders confiscatec.
within five days, and closed all places of worship. ;
The Spanish Church officially allied itself with the
Insurgents and with Fascism in September 1937, when two Span-
ish cardinals and forty-six other prelates signed a pastoral
letter which declared the revolt of General Franco to be a
legitimate one. Isidoro, Cardinal Goma y Tomas, the Vatican’s
representative with the Insurgent regime was the first signa-
tory of the letter which stressed the following five points:^
1. The Commonweal. October 2, 1936, pp. 517-518.
2. The New Republic
,
September 16, 1936, pp. 145-147.
3. New York Times
,
July 29, 1936, p. 1.
4. New York Times
, September 3, 1937, p. 1.
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1. The Church didn’t want the war, even
though thousands of sons of the Church had taken
arms to save the principles of religion and
Christian justice.
2. Since 1931, the legislative and execu-
tive power in Spain has changed Spanish history-
in a sense contrary to the needs of the national
apirit.
3. The elections of 1936 were unjust.
Although the Rightist-Center parties received
500,000 more votes, they received 118 fewer
seats because of arbitrary annulment of votes
in all the provinces.
4. The Communist International had armed
a "revolutionary Spanish militia".
5. The Civil War is legitimate because
five years of continued outrages of Spanish
subjects in the religious and social fields
had endangered the very existence of public
welfare and had produced enormous spiritual
unrest among the Spanish people. . . .
Late in the summer of 1937, the attitude of the
Loyalist regime toward the Church became increasingly more
moderate. On August 7, the Government authorized the resump-
tion of private religious services throughout the territory
under its control. 1 On August 12, it issued a decree making
it an offense to molest a priest of any religion in the admin-
istration of a sacrament.
2
Three days later, mass was cele-
brated openly in the cities of Valencia and Madrid for the first
time since the closing of all the Catholic Churches at the
beginning of the rebellion.
3
1. New York Time s, August 8, 1937, P* 30.
2. New York Time s, August 13, 1937, p. 11.
3. New "York Times
,
August 16, 1937, p. 7*
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According to Herbert L. Matthews, in March 1938,
2,000 masses were being held in Barcelona every day, and 3,000
priests were living peaceably in that city and administering
all of the sacraments freely.
1
3. The Vatican and the Hierarchy
On July 22, 1936, an AP dispatch quoted L* Osservatore
Romano
,
authoritative newspaper of Vatican City, as stating
that the Catholic Church had interested itself in neither side
of the conflict. - But three months later, in openly charging
that Bolshevik propaganda had caused the Spanish Civil War,
Pope Pius XI declared:
''Satanic preparation has relighted— in
neighboring Spain--that hatred and savage per-
secution which have been confessedly reserved
for the Catholic Church and Catholic religion
as being the one real obstacle. . . . Those are
the forces which have already given the measure
of themselves in subversive attacks on every
kind of order, from Russia to China and from
Mexico to South America; . . .
According to Camille Clanfarra, during the movement
of Fascist and Nazi planes, troops, and equipment into Spain,
L 1 Qsservatore Romano and the Fascist press, in perfect harmony,
vied with each other in publishing fearful accounts of Loyalist
persecution of the clergy and the faithful. 4
In August 1937, after the Vatican had granted the
Insurgents the right to maintain informal diplomatic relations
1. New York Times
,
March 13, 1937, p. 6.
2. New Yor£~Ttmes
,
July 23, 1936, p. 2.
3* New -iork Times
,
September 15, 1936, p. 1, 25.
4. '*The Vatican and the War," p. 107
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80 .
with its Secretary of State, Pablo Churruga was sent to Home
as charge d'affaires for the Franco National Government. 1 In
May of the following year, formal diplomatic relations were
established between Vatican City and Burgos, and the Holy See
recognized the Franco regime as the legitimate Government or
Spain.
2
Soon after Cardinal Pacelli, Papal Secretary of
State, became Pope Pius XII, he received a congratulatory mes-
sage from General Franco. In reply, the new Pope sent the
following communication to the Insurgent leader, on March 9,
1939:
"Formulating auguries for new successes
conforming with the glorious Catholic traditions
of Spain and blessing beloved Spain, we cordially
thank you for your devoted message and invoke
divine assistance for your Excellency . "3
There can be little doubt that the Vatican policy
in support of the Spanish Church since 1931 had been one of
hostility toward the Republic. From 1931 to 1936, the Church
and the Vatican lined up behind any faction in Spanish poli-
tics--notably Gil Robles' Catholic Popular Action party--
which promised to restore Catholicism by legal means. But
when the rebellion broke out in 1936, the Vatican and the
Church did not hesitate to support the forces of General fran-
co, which promised to restore Catholicism by the sword. The
Vatican was for Franco, as George Seldes has said, because
1. New xprk Time s, August 4, 1937, P» 1*
2. The Catholic World
, July 1938, p. 494.
3. New York Times
.
March 10, 1939, p. 1.
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Franco was for the Vatican.
Cianfarra discusses the Vatican policy in relation to
the Civil War in the following passages:
"The Papacy had been accused of supporting
Fascism because the Spanish clergy sided with
Franco and the Vatican gave the Insurgents its
moral support during the Spanish Civil War. The
Vatican never concealed its sympathies for the
Spanish dictator, but it always denied that it
was in favor of one ideology as against another.
... To the Holy See, Franco represented the man
who was defending the Church in Spain, and the
only objective of Vatican policy. . .is that of
spreading Catholicism and obtaining for its
religious bodies favorable working conditions.
True, this aim sometimes coincides with those
of governments that are totalitarian in character,
and therefore in contrast with the fundamental
concepts of democracy. .
John V. Hinkel announced on August 6, 1933, that a
book was ready for publication at Burgos which would indicate
that Catholic ecclesiastics throughout the world were unani-
mously in support of the cause of the Spanish Nationalists.
The book, according to this report, would contain messages of
sympathy, addressed to Cardinal G-oma, Primate of Spain, from
nearly 900 cardinals, archbishops, and bishops concerning the
persecution of the Catholic Church in Loyalist territory.
With Vatican approval, it would be published as a sequel to
the 1937 pastoral letter of the Spanish hierarchy, would con-
tain letters of sympathy from collective hierarchies of the
United States, Canada, Great Britain, Mexico, and many other
countries, and would be introduced by a foreword written in
1. The New Republic
,
November 9, 1933, pp. b-9.
2. Ibid., p. 270-271.
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the form of a letter to Cardinal Goma by Cardinal Pacelli,
Papal Secretary of State. 1
But long before the publication of this collection
of letters purporting to show that Catholics of the world were
united for Franco, members of the hierarchy in Europe and Amer-
ica--with such exceptions as Cardinal Verdi er in France and
Cardinal Mundelein in the United States, had rallied to the
moral cause of the Spanish Insurgents.
In attacking the Archbishop of Westminster, primate
of the Roman Catholic Church in England, for his support of
the Franco regime, Reinhold Niebuhr made the observation that
evidently the strong condemnation of rebellion in orthodox
Christianity can be easily overcome if' the Church happens to
be on the side of the rebels. Niebuhr said in part:
"
...One might wish that revolutions were
otherwise and that the passions of conflict were
more restrained. But it ought to be the first
task of a profound religion to deal realistically
with the causes of these terrible passions. . . .
We find instead the Catholic Church, wrapped in
a cloak of self-righteousness, calling God's
curse upon 'the heathen peoples whose trust is
in their ferocity’ and speaking of rebels against
constitutional authority as 'the forces of Christ-
ian law and order' . The force of religion is
used, in other words, exclusively to increase
rather than to mitigate the natural self-deception
and pretension of the human heart. . . . " 2
If, as the Catholic hierarchy proclaimed to the
world, the Spanish Insurgents were protecting the Church and
the Catholic faith by crusading against Communism, then their
1. New York Time s, August 7, 1933, p. 26.
2. The Christi an Century
,
September 2, 1936, p. 11^3.
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action in persecuting the Basque clergy and the devout but
fiercely independent Basques was far from being consistent with
their avowed aims. Jose Antonio de Aguirre, President of the
Basque Government, has stated that, as early as October I936,
the persecution of the Basque clergy by the forces of General
Franco resulted in 15 priests being executed, 150 being con-
fined in Falange prisons with sentences varying from between
six years imprisonment to the death sentence. According to
President Aguirre, Monsignor Mugica, Bishop of Vitoria was
exiled by the Nationalists, and among others exiled and
deprived of their posts were nine dignitaries of the Episcopal
Tribunal, 13 professors of the seminary, six archpriests, 69
parish priests, 101 co-adjutors, 88 chaplains, and I3I monks of
different orders.
1
The crime committed by these Basque
Catholic clergymen was the defense of their freedom or con-
science and that of their people against a Fascist tyranny
which pretended to be a religion crusade.
-
The attitude of the Roman Catholic Church in the
United States toward the Spanish Civil War, and the very
great influence it exerted over the makers of American for-
eign policy will be considered in Part II of this work.
1. Report of the Sub-Committee on the Spanish Question,
Official Records, UN Security Council, June 1946, p. 77.
2. Ibid .
,
p. 78.
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CHAPTER V
FOREIGN INTERVENTION:
THE TOTALITARIAN STATES
Since foreign intervention in the Spanish Civil War
began as soon as the rebellion broke out in Morocco on July
16, 1936, the conflict at no time could have been considered
as one which was the concern of Spain and Spain alone. As
soon as the totalitarian states of both the Right and the Left
were convinced that Great Britain and France had officially
abandoned the cause of democracy in Spain, masks were ripped
off and the struggle on the Iberian Peninsula, despite the
endless sham and hypocrisy of successive non-intervention pro-
posals, became the dress rehearsal for World War II.
It was in Spain that Hitler and Mussolini first
waged a war of aggression side by side. From the first to the
last, the Fascist powers, despite the fact that they were mem-
bers of the International Committee for the Application of the
Agreement regarding Non-Intervention in Spain, provided the
Insurgents with the troops, planes, and materials of war
necessary for the destruction of the Spanish Republic.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union supported the
Loyalist Government and its hydra-headed Leftist successor,
anxious to see a Soviet Republic of Spain, or a pro-Soviet
constitutional government, or at least an anti-Axis regime in
control of the Iberian Peninsula.
This chapter will deal with the extent of foreign
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Intervention In the Spanish conflict and the reasons why this
Intervention was to result in an internal disorder becoming
the gravest, the most significant, and the final warning to
the community of nations of the impending tragedy which en-
gulfed the world in 1939*
A. Intervention: Italy
Italy, according to some reports, intervened in the
Spanish Civil War the day before Franco' s forces revolted. On
July 30
,
1936
,
three Italian Savoia bombers were forced to land
in French Morocco, two others crashed near Oran in Algeria, and
a sixth fell near Nemours. All six bombers, each of which car-
ried t!^en machine guns, left a military airdrome at Milan on
the morning of July 27 • However, the order to transport the
planes to Spanish Morocco, copies of which were found on the
dead aviators, had been issued by Italian military authorities
on July 15* A London T imes correspondent stated that the
flying orders for these aircraft had been issued on July 17« r~
None of these planes, the pilots and crews of which
were officers in the Italian Air Force, were carrying the mark-
ings prescribed in international conventions. According to
Raymond Leslie Buell, the orders which sent these bombers to
Spanish Morocco constituted a violation of the international
air convention of 1919 and the traffic in arms convention or
1925. 3
1. Paassen, Pierre van, Days of Our Year s, p. 434.
2. New York Times
.
March 14, 1937, p. 46.
3. Foreign Policy Bulletin
.
August 7, 1936.
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By late summer and early fall, Italy was entering
the first stages of a full scale war or aggression against the
Spanish Republic. Testifying in London before an unofficial
committee backed by Labor members of Parliament, William E.
Dodd, Jr., son of the United States Ambassador in Berlin,
stated that, on August 20, he witnessed the unloading of a
cargo of airplanes from an Italian ship which had docked at
Vigo, Spain. 1 Foreign aid for Franco had been so considerable
by October, that Frank L. Kluckhohn estimated the backbone of
General Franco’s army was by that time composed of Italian,
German, and Moorish troops. 2 An editorial in the November 1
edition of the New York Times declared that, whether or not
one agreed with Mr. Kluckhohn’ s conclusion, there could be no
doubt that without such assistance the Rebel advances would
have been seriously retarded.
5
In January 1937, it was reported that 10,000 troops
were being rushed to Spain to aid in Franco's next all-out
offensive against Madrid.^ Two months later, Herbert L. Mat-
thews quoted J. Alvarez del Vayo as estimating that at least
60,000 Italian troops were in Spain. 5
On March 23, 1937, Count Grandi, of Italy, declared
before the London Non-Intervention Committee that the Italian
"volunteer" would not leave bpanish territory until General
Franco had gained a complete and final victory.*3 Nevertheless,
1. New York Times
, October 2, 1936, p.l.
2. New York Times
.
October 30, 1936, p. 3.
3. New York Times , November 1, 1936, p. E 8.
4. New York Times
, January 6, 1937, p. 1«
5. New York Times
.
March 1, 1937, p. 7*
Hel_IVayo T ,rFreedom T s Battle," p. 46.
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87.
eight days after Grandi’s statement, Signor Alfieri, Minister
of Press and Propaganda, renewed assurances that the measures
II
taken by the Non-Intervention Committee have been and always
" i
will be respected by the Italian Government.
One year later, on March 30, 1938, Benito Mussolini
declared before the Italian Senate that thousands of Italian
officers had gained actual experience in two wars, in Abyssinia
and in Spain. 1 On May 20, 11 Duce wrote in 11 Popolo d'ltalia:
"We have intervened from the first to the
last moment. "2
On April 16, 1933, in concluding an agreement with
Italy, Great Britain admitted the cruel farce of non-interven-
tion. By this Perth-Ciano accord, which took a Franco victory
for granted, Italy agreed that, all "volunteers" not. withdrawn
from Spain by the end of the war would leave Immediately after
its conclusion in Franco' s favor. At the same time, it was
agreed that all Italian war material, hitherto considered as
non-existent by the Non-Intervention Committee, would be
simultaneously withdrawn.
^
In an editorial in the February 7, 1939 edition or
the Giornale d'ltalia, Virginio Gayda stated that Italy would
not withdraw her troops from Spain until General Franco had
gained a complete military victory and had firmly established
his political regime.'1 On March 28, Mussolini made the follow-
1. Ibid., p. 47.
2. UN Security Council Sub-Committee Report- -Spanish
Question, p. 8. 3« Foreign Policy Bulletin, April 22,
1938. 4. New York Times, February 8. 1939, p. 15.
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ing announcement of the fall of Madrid:
‘'General Franco's infantry and Italian
legionaries have entered Madrid. Therefore the
Spanish war may be regarded as finished. It has
ended with the defeat of Bolshevism. All the
enemies of Italy and fascism will come to the
same end ."
1
On the next day, and editorial in the Rome Gorriere
della Sera
,
said of Franco’s triumph:
"The event will have enormous repercussions
in South America and is most likely to contribute
to exalting the spirits of those Spanish- speaking
countries while proportionately reducing the
artificial and harmful influences of the Anglo-
Saxon powers. "2
Although the Spanish Civil War had been declared at
an end on April 1, 1939, the Italian Government reneged on its
pledge in the Perth-Ciano accord of the previous year and post-
phoned the withdrawal of troops and materials to May 15, the
date set for General Franco's triumphant march into Madrid.^
After three years of war and after three years of
"respectfully complying" with the Non-Intervention Agreement,
the Italian Government, through an article published in the
official Forze Armate , disclosed the extent of its aid to the
Spanish Insurgents. This article revealed that, in the months
from December 1936 to April 1937 alone, the Italian Navy
transported 100,000 men, 4,370 motor vehicles, 40,000 tons of
munitions, and 750 cannon to Spain. According to the admis-
sion of this official organ, after November 1, 1936, Italian
1. New York Times
.
March 29, 1939, P» 1*
2. New York Times
.
March 30, 1939, p. 3.
3. Foreign Policy Bulletin , April 21, 1939*
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submarines torpedoed commercial shipping bound lor Loyalist
ports and were responsible for creating the piracy menace which
resulted in the calling of the Nyon Conference in September
1937. 1
In disclosing that over 6,000 Italian military avia-
tors operating Italian machines eventually saw service in
Spain, Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, stated
in the Fascist periodical, Gerarchla , that Italy’s intervention
in the Civil War began on July 2b, 1936, when that Government
sent its first nine bombers to Spanish Morocco.
2
B. Intervention: Germany
There seems to be little doubt that Nazi Germany not
only was aware of the conspiracy against the Spanish Republic,
but had given assurances of aid to the Insurgents even before
the revolt began. On July 15, 1936, the day before the Civil
War broke out, Volklscher Beobachter
,
official organ of the
German Government, propheslzed the rebellion in the following
words:
"
. . . It will not be the first time in
the course of these twenty years, that the sum-
mer holidays in Spain are interrupted by grave
political surprises. "3
Germany’s first official act of intervention occurred
in mid-July when Adolf Hitler placed a Deutsche Lufthansa
plane at General Franco’s disposal for the latter’s historic
1. Foreign Policy Bulletin
,
June 16, 1939*
2. Ibid .
3. Del Vayo, op. cit .. p. 51*
a. I: v. ... ;]• - l >- « :V(.yrc j L‘ HP
>1j .' ; • ro ‘t t f i 1 ' ".if icc
t
<
.
--I- I . ?*'0 .'I .c : ^ >J . : t i •:
.
IjjL f
.
•
_
-
JC
.
..
f J .»/.<
,0t’i L ' •* in t :: t . i \ -%i i . K
:
.
. : ..
'
'
.. J
d
,
I i.J : J
, . ; i.
'
•
,
.-
.
i
t
"
-
r f
...
i J.
.
,
r.-
;
' i."
"
.
• : i
.
. .
90 .
flight from the Canary Islands to Tetuan, which was destined
to be the signal for the opening of hostilities .
1
Nazi military and material aid to Franco began at
the beginning of August 1936. On the 11th day of that month,
Frank L. Kluckhohn reported the arrival at Rebel headquarters
in Seville of 20 heavy German Junker bombers and five German
pursuit planes, all manned by German military pilots?
Herbert L. Matthews, in commenting on the extent of
German aid to the Rebels, said in December 1936:
"... but on the general proposition that
German soldiers and technicians are helping
General Francisco Franco, Rebel leader, we could
not be wrong. Today there is talk of 20,000
Reichswehr troops in all having been landed at
Cadiz . -
William E. Dodd, Jr. declared in London^ that on
September 24, 1936, he saw 15 fully-armed men go ashore from
a German ship at Vigo, Spain. 5 Kluckhohn reported in October
1936 that the new rifles and machine guns being unloaded at
Vigo and other ports were being shipped from Hamburg . 0
By January 1937, it was estimated that there were
14,000 Germans in Spain.
?
The official Nazi admission that "volunteers" from
the Third Reich were fighting in Spain came in the form of an
1. UN Security Council Sub-Committee Report- -Spanish
Question, p. 7*
2. New York Times
, August 12, 1936, p. 1.
3. New York Times , December 27, 1936, p. E 4.
4. See p. 86 .
5. New York Times , October 2, 1936, p. 1.
6 . New York Times
, October 30, 1936, p. 3 .
7» New York Times
.
January 6
, 1937, P« 1*
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article by Count CLano in Wille gnd Macht
,
German Youth period-
ical, in which the Italian Foreign Minister highly praised the
German aid to Burgos.
1
On February 23, 1939, the following telegram from
General Franco to Adolf hitler was published in Berlin:
"When, after the conclusion of the campaign
in Catalonia, victorious troops marched into
Barcelona, heroic German volunteers were among
them, and in hailing them the Spanish people
hailed Germany and its Fuehrer. . . ."2
Two months after Franco’s victory, Nazi Germany,
which had been repeatedly absolved of all charges of inter-
vention by the London Non-Intervention Committee, displayed the
utmost contempt for the "decadent" democracies by officially
admitting the following violations of international law and
the Non-Intervention Agreement: On July 20, 1936, some 20
Lufthansa transport planes had begun to ferry 13,000 Moorish
troops to the Spanish mainland. Eleven days later, the first
group of German aviation personnel, disguised as tourists,
left Hamburg for Spain in German ships which also carried mili-
tary aircraft, bombs, and anti-aircraft guns. In September,
pursuit and observation squadrons, a battery of heavy anti-
aircraft artillery and two tank companied landed in Spain.
Late in the next month, a complete air corps of 6,500 men nad
been sent to the Iberian Peninsula. Nazi sea, air, and lana
forces, commanded by regular officers, according to Berlin,
1. New York Times
.
February 24, 1939, P« 3»
2. Ibid.
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saw action on every Spanish front. In addition to this direct
participation in the conflict, the Germans conducted tank, anti
tank, communications, and flame- throwing schools, as well as a
training school for 56,000 Spanish officers. 1
After openly and boastfully admitting that German
troops, not volunteers but regular members of the armed forces,
were sent to Spain for periods of training in actual warfare,
official Germany prepared to welcome the vanguard of those
mighty legions which were soon to sweep across Europe. On
June 6, 1939, in Berlin, 15,000 German veterans of the Condor
Legion, and 2,500 German sailors passed before Chancellor
Hitler, and received their Fuehrer's praise for a Job well done
pin Spain.
C. Intervention: Portugal
Hostile to the Spanish Republic since the abdication
of Alfonso XIII in 1931, the Fascist dictatorship in Portugal
was, from the first days of the Civil War, a willing accomplice
in the death of constitutional government in Spain.
When the London Non-Intervention Committee first
proposed an arms embargo against both factions in the Spanish
conflict, there seemed little doubt in August 1936 that such
a policy would prove to the great advantage of the Republican
forces in the long run. In addition to a gold reserve of
1. Foreign Policy Bulletin
,
June 16, 1939*
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93 .
$700,000,000, the Loyalist Government controlled the country's
two most important industrial centers, Madrid and Barcelona,
while the Insurgents were forced to depend to a considerable
degree on foreign supplies and arms. 1
After having refused previously to commit herself on
proposals which would ban arms shipments to the theater of war
and patrol the borders and coasts of Spain to enforce the em-
bargo, Portugal stayed away from the first meeting of the Non-
Intervention Committee which was held on September 9, 1936.^
At about this time, according to the report of New York Times
correspondent Frank L. Kluckhohn, although there was no evi-
dence that arms and materials of war were being sent to the
Spanish Insurgents, ships of nations favoring the Rebel cause
had been arriving in Portuguese harbors in large numbers, and
caravans were being sent off toward the Spanish frontier bear-
ing "unknown products carefully covered by sheets of canvas."^
The New Republic , in an editorial commenting upon the
attitude of Portugal and the non-intervention proposals, de-
clared:
"The situation calls for a thorough and
prompt investigation. Portugal is supposed to
be under British diplomatic influence; one wonders
whether the Foreign Office is disposed to wink
at what is going on there, in spite of the fact
that Great Britain was one of the most ardent
advocates of the non-intervention agreement. . . .
International law and custom made it perfectly
proper to aid the Spanish government while deny-
ing help to the rebels. This would have been the
normal procedure. . . . Tftiy should not an interna-
1. Foreign Policy Bulletin
.
August 28, 1936.
2. New York Times
, September 10, 1936, p. 20.
3* The new Republic. September 30. 1936. p. 212-213.
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tional police force examine all shipments to
Spain, whether through Portugal or France or the
Atlantic and Mediterranean ports. Surely Portugal
is not in a position to object, France would not
do so, and neither Germany nor Italy could with
good faith refuse to allow their ships to be
searched by an international force charged with
the duty of carrying out a pledge that they had
mad e • . • •
In London, William E. Dodd, Jr. statea
2
that while
on a holiday trip to Lisbon on September 18, 1936, he observed
that a large number of armaments firms’ representatives were
staying in the Portuguese capital. From talking with two Eng-
lishmen, Dodd said he discovered that Vickers arms were being
bought in Portugal, but being sent directly to the Insurgents
in Spain.
Del Vayo charges that the Portuguese frontier auth-
orities were not content with permitting munitions lorries to
be loaded in Portuguese ports and sent without dealy through
Portuguese territory to the Rebels, but that these same fron-
tier authorities, other than interning all Republican forces
attempting to fall back into Portugal, handed them over to
the Insurgents.^
Of the reasons why Britain, whose influence was
paramount in Portugal, should have allowed her ally of nearly
300 years to help make the Non-Intervention Agreement one of
the basest farces in modern history, Anne O’Hare McCormick said:
1. Ibid .
2. See p. 86.
3 . New York Times , October 2, 1936, p.l.
4. Ibid
.
,
p. 30.
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"The impression prevails in official circles
that in the Spanish affair British and Portuguese
interests are in harmony. It is thought that
Britain, while striving by every means to keep
the fire from spreading does not desire to see
Spain under Russian tutelage and desires still less
to see her Portuguese ally swallowed up in a
sovietized, svndicalized or anarchistic Iberian
union. . . .
"
*
On January 20, 1937, Portugal formally notified
Great Britain that she was unwilling to accept the internation-
al arms supervisory plan, and gave an indication that she
2
would not allow an international naval patrol off her coast.
One month later, when France accepted supervision of the
Pyrenees frontier and Britain accepted supervision of the
Gibralter frontier, Portugal persisted in her refusal to allow
any international supervision within her territory.
On August 19, 1937, the Portuguese Government broke
off diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia, when officials
at Prague had refused to permit the export of machine guns
ordered from a government- controlled Czechoslovak factory.
Czechoslovakia’s refusal was based on its obligation under the
Non-Intervention Agreement not to supply either side with the
materials or munitions of war, directly or indirectly.^
D. Intervention: Russia
How large a share of the responsibility for the
Spanish tragedy--if any--must fall on the shoulders of the
Soviet Union? And what role did Moscow and the Communist
1. New York Times
,
January 19, 1937, p. 13*
2. iflew York Times , January 21, 1937, p. 3.
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Third International play in the Spanish conflict? Nearly
every correspondent, international observer, author, politician
or churchman lecturing or writing on the Spanish Civil 'Aar
has given answers to these questions. But not all of the
answers have been the same.
Many Franco sympathizers and many objective observers
have attempted to Justify the Spanish rebellion by arguing
that, once the Republic was established in 1931, the forces of
the exreme Left immediately began their preparations for a
social revolution and a dictatorship of the proletariat, with
the behind-the-scenes assistance of Moscow.
Soviet influence first made its appearance on the
Spanish political scene in 1927, but although the Kremlin and
the Third International had been keeping a close watch on
trends in Spain, this Influence seems to have been negligible.
After 1931, the Russian plan, according to Lawrence A. Ferns-
worth, seems to have been to assume a passive attitude toward
democracy in Spain, which provided a bulwark against Fascism,
and at the same time allowed free reign to the revolutionary
activity of the extreme Left. Fernsworth says that in 1936
more than 100 Spanish Communists who had takenrefuge in Russia
after the Revolution of 1934 had failed, returned to their
native land well versed in Soviet revolutionary tactics and
concepts, and re?dy to put their theory into practice . 1
Michael Williams, editor of The Commonweal , claims
1. Foreign Affairs , July 1936, p. 665 .
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that the Insurgents were in possession of' positive evidence
that a Red plot was being hatched which would replace consti-
tutional government with the proletarian dictatorship, liquid-
ate all members of the Catholic and Right-wing parties, and
wipe out the clergy, the nuns, and all others suspected of
having any affiliation with or sympathy for Catholicism, con-
servatism, or even Catholic liberalism.^
Gerald Brenan says or the alleged Communist plot to
v
establish a Soviet Republic of Spain in 1936:
"One may dismiss the story that they were
planning a revolution for that autumn as Fascist
propaganda. A revolution would have alienated
the Western Democracies whom Stalin was courting
at this time. It would have put Largo Caballero
and the Socialists into power. The Communist
policy this spring was simply to take advantage
of the revolutionary situation to increase their
own influence and following. They would, thus be
in a position whatever happened to influence
events.
The Right-wing extremists could not charge the
Soviet Embassy with being implicated in the alleged Red plot
to overthrow the Spanish Republic because, as del Vayo main-
tains:
"... for there had been no soviet Ambas-
sador in Spain, nor had there ever been one since
the Russian Revolution. When the rebellion
broke out, Republican Spain was maintaining nor-
mal diplomatic relations with every country ex-
cept the U.S.S.R. The Republic did not recog-
nize Soviet Russia until 1933^ • . . . The first
Soviet Ambassador did not arrive in Spain until
the end of August 1936, after the outbreak of
the rebellion.
1.
The Commonwe al, May 7, 1937, pp. 33-37*
2. Ibid ., p. 3O7
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Soviet intervention in the Civil War began in Sept-
ember 1936 when a Russian General Staff, headed by General
Goriev, first sat in on the sessions of the Loyalist War Of-
fice, over which it soon exerted a great influence.^ By Octo-
ber 29, the Loyalists were using Russian tanks and artillery,
-
and on November 11, the first Russian plane saw action.^
Although Russia did not, as did Germany and Italy,
send complete combat units to Spain, the Russian General Start'
did organize the international brigades into very effective
fighting units. In discussing this international support for
the Spanish Republic, Herbert L. Matthews said:
. .An important factor is an interna-
tional column which is formed from volunteers
from the four corners of the world who have come
here to fight for their ideals. Some of them are
Communists, others are Socialists, Liberals, and
Democrats, but they all have one thing in common
—
they are anti-Fascist. . . . ,,Zf
De Madariaga states that the contingent of Soviet
technical experts which saw service in Spain, has been esti-
mated at about 6,000 men, but that no more than 500 were there
at a time.-^
While Dr. Juan Negrin was Minister of Finance, on
October 25, 1936, 7t800 boxes of gold were shipped from Carta-
gena, Spain to Odessa, Russia. ^ On December 21, 1936, a
letter to Largo Caballero signed by Stalin, Molotov, and Voro-
1. De Madariaga, op. clt .
, p. 384.
2. Ibid .
,
p. 383.
3. Del Vayo, op. cit., p. 63.
4. New York Ttfigg
,
December 27, 1936, p. E 4.
5. Ibid ., p. 380.
6. De Madariaga, op. clt ., p. 392.
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shilov, was taken to Spain by Marcel Rosenberg, Soviet Ambas-
sador. 1 And on January 1, 1937, the following New Year’s
greeting from Premier Largo Caballero to the U.S.S.R. was pub-
lished in I zvestia :
"... The Spanish working class is forever
united with the Russian workers. We will never
forget the solidarity of the Soviet workers with
us in this difficult time. The proletariat of
Spain will always strive during the war and
after the war is over to follow the example of
your great country."
2
De Madariaga contends that the soviet Union increased
or reduced its supplies to the Loyalists accordingly as the
Government changed its attitude toward Communists and Commun-
ist-sympathizers. When Indalecio Prieto, who shared power
with Negrin, removed J. Alvarez del Vayo from the post or
political commissar of the Army, abolished the system of com-
missars, and prohibited political propaganda in the Army, the
Russians drastically cut shipments of arms and supplies to
Republican Spain.'
Much of the abuse heaped upon the Loyalist Government
was undoubtedly due to the support and aid which it accepted
from the Soviet Union. But, despite the ulterior motives
which may have been behind Moscow’s action in aiding Madrid,
the fact cannot be ignored that the U.S.S.R. was merely re-
verting to a normal practice under international law of sell-
ing arms to a legitimate government.
1. Ibid
.
,
p. 390.
2. New York Times
,
January 2, 1937, P« 2.
3. De Madariaga, op. cit .
,
p. 397»
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In May 1939, alter the fall of the Republic, Negrln
attempted to explain the Loyalist dependence upon the soviet
Union before the Council of Foreign Relations in New York.
The Premier in exile said:
"Of course we bought from Russia what, had
the democracies observed international law and
protected their national interests, we should
have been able to buy from the United States,
France, and England. Would you have asked us
to refuse Russian arms when we could not get
arms anywhere else?" 1
1. Del Vayo, op. clt
., p. 76.
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CHAPTER VI
NON- 1NTERVENTI ON
:
THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES
By following an official policy of strict non-in-
tervention, France and Great Britain were just as responsible
for the final defeat of the Spanish Republic as were the Axis
Powers in following their policy of direct intervention.
World War II did not become inevitable when the
Western Democracies adopted their non-intervention policy in
regard to the Spanish conflict. It did become inevitable when
France and Great Britain refused to face the fact that their
pusillanimous policy of peace at any price had made of the
Non-Intervention Agreement a spectacle of nauseating hypocrisy
and transparent dishonesty.
Though the cause of constitutional government was
succumbing to the attack of the Left-extremists as well as the
extremists of the Right once the Civil War had begun, Spain
gave the Democracies their last chance to make a stand in sup-
port of their own cause. When London and Paris chose to con-
tinue their retreat, when they chose a policy of one-way neut-
rality, they accepted war and their own ruin as the future.
A. France
1. Official Non-Intervention
On July 24, 1936, the New York Times reported that
it was understood in Paris that Premier Leon Blum and Foreign
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Minister Yvon von Delbos had indicated a willingness to auth-
orize exports of arms to the Spanish Government.
1
Two days
later, Jules Sauerwein, Foreign Editor of the Parls-Soir
.
stated that at least four countries were taking an active in-
terest in the Spanish struggle, with Britain, Germany, and
Italy each giving "discreet" hut effective assistance to the
Insurgents, while France was supporting the Madrid Government.
On August 1, the Quai d'Orsay announced that, in
view of the attitude of certain other powers, France reserved
the right to sell arms to the Spanish Republic. At the same
time, it was indicated that France had as yet not permitted
war materials to enter Spain even in fulfillment of contracts
entered into prior to the outbreak of the rebellion. ^ But
later on the same day, Premier Blum made an appeal to all
Powers to adopt "common rules of non-intervention.
Del Vayo quotes Pertinax (Andre Geraud) as stating
that the non-intervention proposal of the French Premier had
its origin in a communication from London to Paris in which
Great Britain informed the French Government that she would
no longer guarantee to maintain the frontiers of France if
independent French action were taken in Spain. ^ Del Vayo, in
further explaining his allegation, says:
1. New York Times
,
July 24, 1936, p. 3.
2. New York Times
,
July 26, 1936, p. 2.
3. New ^ork Times
,
August 2, 1936, p. 1.
4. F. L. Schuman, International Politics, p. 596.
5. Ibid., p. 63.
.• / ... x •> r.U ' r* V. • ‘
< ,
;
.
5 .
v n 1 • j. ;
,
'
.
K ' - J t ‘ •>
. .
; .. .
'
' n- ' t
.
•
.
, e
...
.
"The British warning. . . was conveyed to
M. Yvon Delbos, the French Minister of Foreign
Affairs, in the course of a visit by Sir George
Clerk, the British Ambassador to Paris. Sir
George is understood to have said that if France
should find herself in conflict with Germany as
a result of having sold war material to the
Spanish Government, England would consider her-
self released from her obligations under the
Locarno Pact and would not come to help. 1,1
When Premier Blum’s official proposal that non-inter-
vention be applied to Spain was accepted, within a few days, by
all the major countries of Europe, Edwin L. James optimistical-
ly predicted that the danger of the Civil War involving Old
World nations with divergent political philosophies would cer-
tainly grow less.
2
An editorial in The New Republic , however,
had a much less optimistic tone:
"... France hesitated, Britain sat on both
sides of the fence, while Germany and Italy were
rushing airplanes and tanks to the rebels. The
fascist nations bullied the democratic nations
into regarding the military revolt as a genuine
civil war. ... At present Premier Blum's policy
of shipping arms to neither side is tne soundest
and wisest possible, on tnn assumption that all
the powers can oe Drought to respect it. bo de-
velopment In any one country, no matter how dis-
astrous, is worth a European war. . . ."3
After 16 months of non-intervention, John C. DeWilde,
in reporting that the French were becoming increasingly impat-
ient with the constant failure of the London Committee's pro-
posals, said:
1. Ibid., p. 68.
2. New York Times
,
August 9, 1936, p. E 3*
3. The New Republic
.
September 9, 1936, pp. 117-118.
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"While London is apparently preparing to
abandon the Spanish Loyalists to Franco, a recent
congress of the French Radical Socialist party of
which Chautemps [Premier? and Delbos [Foreign Minis-
terjare members, manifested a strong desire to
have non-intervention in Spain either terminated
or strictly enforced. . . .
2. Unofficial Aid to Madrid
There seems to be little doubt that the sympathies
of the great majority of Frenchmen were, in regard to the
Spanish Civil War, strongly pro-Madrid and very much pro-Span-
ish Popular Front. P. J. Philip, reporting on this sentiment
from Paris, declared:
"It was as much in an effort to secure
neutrality within his own Cabinet and the coun-
try as internationally that Premier Blum, on
the advice of Foreign Minister Delbos, launched
the appeal £or a non-intervention pact. But so
far he has not succeeded either abroad or at
home. Every morning the newspapers in Paris
show markedly how partisan sentiment has be-
come. "~
De Madariaga says that the first impulse of the
French Government was to aid the Spanish Republic, and that she
would have done so if the Civil War had not suddenly trans-
formed itself into a social revolution vs. a military rebellion,
and if France had been better prepared in a military sense to
risk a European adventure of much greater magnitude.
3
But, if France did not give official aid to Republi-
can Spain, she did not go out of her way to discourage unoffi-
1. Foreign Policy Bulletins
,
December 3, 1937.
2. New York Times , August 23, 1936, p. E 3*
3 . De Madariaga, op. ci t.
,
p. 385.
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cial aid to Madrid. In August 1936, Frenchmen were permitted
to fight in the Civil War provided they carried regular pass
ports.
1
The International Brigades were formed in France wlth|
the implied approval of the Government, the first one saving
Madrid during Franco’s first drive on the capital, and the
p
second brigade reaching the front on November 14, 1936.
"
Private citizens of France aided the Loyalist cause
in many different ways. Andre Malraux, for example, purchased
aircraft abroad, and recruited a French Foreign Legion of the
Air which fought for the Madrid Government.
-
B. Great Britain
1.
British Opinion and the Civil War
Although a majority of the British people favored the
cause of constitutional government in Spain, the Spanish Rebels
found many sympathizers among influential religious and social
groups and among powerful business interests in Great Britain.
Ferdinand Kuhn Jr., in October 1936, reported that
there was a passionate pro-Madrid feeling amont the British
working people, which found vigorous expression in Labor and
3Liberal newspapers throughout the country. The British Labor
Party, speaking for a considerable section of the country's
professional class as well as for the great mass of workers,
1. New York Times
,
August 2, 1936, p. 1.
2. De Madariaga, op. clt .
,
p. 386.
3. New York Times , October 11, 1936, p. E 5-
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from the first, vigorously opposed the Government's foreign
policy on Spain. On October 5, the Annual Conference of the
Labor Party at Edinburgh repudiated the action taken by the
British Trade Union Congress on September 10, when it endorsed
the policy of non-intervention. At its conference, the Labor
Party voted to oppose the Government’s foreign policy as a
whole.
On October 29, Arthur Greenwood, Labor! te spokesman,
in demanding that the Government permit the sale of arms and
munitions to Madrid declared:
"Spain has now become a pawn in the game
of power and politics. The Spanish revolt is
not a spontaneous rising of an oppressed peo-
ple. It is a carefully engineered conspiracy,
originated outside Spain and aided and abetted
by powers outside Of Spain ." 2
Herbert Morrison, President of the London City Coun-
cil, stated, on March 30, 1937, that Great Britain, France and
the United States were equally to blame for failing to provide
the legitimate government with the materials of war which would
have enabled the Loyalists to end the conflict a few months af-
ter it had begun.
-
In an address before the House of Commons on January
31, 1939, Clement Atlee attacked the Government’s futile policy
of non-intervention in the following words:
1. Foreign Affairs
.
July 1937, P* 667*
2. New York Times
, October 30, 1936, p. 2.
3» New York Times , March 31, 1937, P* 7*
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"Ever since it has been found that non-in-
tervention is a sham, we have demanded that the
Spanish Government shall be given their rights
under international law. The Government has
steadily refused, always on the one basis that
without non-intervention there may be a widen-
ing of the struggle that may lead to a general
.
European conflict. . . . The strategic position
of Britain has been worsened year by year. An
independent Spain is vital to the safety of
France and Britain. The resistance in Spain
has warded off a crisis which might come to us,
and all the time we played the ignominous part
of holding the hands of Spain while she was at-
tacked by an aggressor and preventing her from
defending herself. . . . 1,1
The most influential of the pro-Franco groups in Eng-
land were the hierarchy and many members of the Catholic
Church, the powerful business and financial interests, and
many members of Britain’s aristocracy.
The Roman Catholic Church in England, profoundly
shocked by the anti- religious excesses alleged to have been com-
mitted by the Republican forces in Spain, according to Kuhn,
so influenced opinion in Britain that many thousands of peace-
ful, middle-class Catholics, especially in the northern shires,
2
were fervently praying for a Rebel victory.
As was to be expected, business opinion in Britain
was strongly pro-Franco, and the conservative press, especially
the Rothermere papers, outdid itself in sensational reporting
of Loyalist atrocities while acclaiming the Insurgents as
"Christian patriots. "5
1. New York Times
,
February 1, 1939, p. 10.
2. New 7ork Times
,
October 11, 1936, p. E 5»
3. Ibid.
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D. Graham Hutton, in explaining the strong pro-Rebel
feeling among the conservative groups in England, said:
"Those on the extreme Right, a small but
vocal minority, showed a narrow, class conception
of British interests. It sufficed for them that
France had just elected a Front Populaire Govern-
ment, that the legitimate Spanish Government was
called Frente Popular, that Communists were sup-
porting both, and that men of property were sup-
porting General Franco. The nineteen-year- old
bogey of Bolshevism in France, in Spain, in
Czechoslovakia- -was evoked by the astute Propa-
ganda Ministries of Italy and Rome for the spec-
ial purpose of impressing the British Conserva-
tives. 1,1
When Harold Nicolson, Labor Member of Parliament, at-
tempted to show how deeply Britain's material interests lay
with the Loyalists, he received the following answer from a
Conservative Member of Parliament, Commander R. T. Bower— an
answer which was typical of the conservative and aristocratic
mentality during this period:
"The real causes of our dislike of the
Spanish government and what it stands for go
beyond consideration of the purely material in-
terests of Britain. The foul cancerous disease
of the Russian soul known as communism. . .is
the deadliest enemy of our very civilization.
Before its threat the hypothetical dangers of
a Franco victory sink into comparative insig-
nificance. . . . The average conservative has
one thing in common with them £the fascist dict-
ators]'. . .a loathing of that bestial creed of
communism .
"
2
2 • Official Non-Intervention
On August 4, 1936, the British Government officially
1. Foreign Affairs, July 1937, p. 663 .
2. Straight, M.
,
"^Make This the Last War," p. 57*
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accepted the proposal"
1
' of French Premier Leon Blum that a rigid
policy of non-intervention be immediately adopted and observed
in regard to the Spanish situation. Eleven days later, offi-
cial London announced:
"it should be realized that the maintenance
of a strict and impartial attitude of non-inter-
vention is essential if the unhappy events in
Spain are to be prevented from having serious
repercussions elsewhere. "2
Augur, reporting from London to the New York Times
,
said of the British attitude:
"The British Government sincerely favors
neutrality in the conflict, although, looking
beneath the surface, it is impossible to dis-
cover in political and business circles here
any sign of sympathy with Madrid. . . .
At about this time, the Government warned British
subjects that all who tried to aid either side in Spain would
receive no official support whatever in any difficulties they
might encounter. Noting this official view, D. Graham Hutton
said that such a drastic denial of aid, even through private
citizens, to the legitimate government of a friendly power en-
gaged in a struggle to suppress "freebooters" whom none of the
democratic governments would recognize as belligerents, inevit-
ably led to charges that non-intervention was only a smoke
screen behind which the Spanish Insurgents were being favored
by the Fascist and democratic regimes alike.'11'
1. See p. 93 for alleged story behind this proposal.
2. Foreign Affairs
.
July 1937, P* 666.
3. New York Times
.
August 17, 1936, o. 3*
4. Foreign Affairs
.
July 1937, P* 666.
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Sir Samuel Hoare, speaking for official London,
said in mid- August 1936 that the British Government would not
think of intervening in the Spanish struggle, even if asked to
do so. But at the same time, Hoare implied that Britain might
be willing to take part in mediating the conflict.'"' On Decem-
ber 19, Edwin L. James reported that Foreign Secretary Anthony
Eden had proposed that Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and
Russia attempt to mediate in Spain, but that nothing further
had happened although the proposal was apparently well received
in the capitals involved.
-
Foreign Secretary Eden stated before the House of
Commons on March 3, 1937, that Britain was constantly consid-
ering the question as to whether steps could oe t-aken lo pro-
vide a oasis for negotiation between tne factions in Spain.
He regretted to say that neither tne Loyalists nor the Nation-
alists gave an indication that they were willing to consider
mediation.
^
In discussing the Foreign Secretary’s statement, de
Madariaga says that Mr. Eden neglected to say that "neither
party" was Spain. The real Spain, according to this author,
had been longing for mediation all the time. When Dr. Julian
Besteiro was sent to London to represent Spain at the Corona-
tion in May 1937, President AzaTfa entrusted him with a peace
1. New York Time s. August 21, 1936, p. 14.
2. New Zork Times
,
December 20, 1936, p. E 3.
3. Vol. 321, House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, p.
334.
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proposal to put before the British Government. Mr. Eden did
not even bother to send a reply to the President of the Spanish
Republic.
Reports, often supported by conclusive evidence, of
Fascist and Nazi intervention in Spain were continually being
placed before the Non-Intervention Committee and the British
Government. But more often than not, when the subject was de-
bated on the floor of the House of Commons, and embarassing
questions were put to spokesmen for the Foreign Office, they
were parried with the terse reply: "His Majesty’s Government
has no information."
When on December 7, 1936, he was asked in the House
of Commons whether he had any information concerning the arri-
val of between 2,000 and 6,000 fully equipped German national-
ists at Cadiz, Eden admitted that the British Government had re
ceived information concerning the landing of 5,000 Germans at
Cadiz and Seville, and said:
"As I have previously indicated to the House,
His Majesty’s Government strongly deprecates the
participation of volunteers from other countries
in the fighting in Spain. "
-
On January 19, 1937, the British Foreign Secretary
made the following statement on the policy of His Majesty’s
Government toward Spain:
1. Ibid., p. 409.
2. Vol. 313, House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, p.
1618.
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"Though the conflict continues with unabated
bitterness, the risk of its involving Europe in a
war, though not yet wholly removed has been defin-
itely diminished. Intervention in the Spanish
Civil War may, and I am afraid will, prolong the
horro-s of that war and increase the sufferings
of the unhappy Spanish people. For that reason,
and others, we have been from the first opposed
to it, and are still so. . . but, unless the whole
past history of Spain is belied in this conflict,
the great mass of the proud Spanish people will
feel the least ill will to those nations which
have intervened the least. If we take the long
view--and In an issue of this kind It is the
long view that counts--interventlon in Spain is
not only bad humanity, it Is bad politics. . . .
None the less we have our own national interests.
What are they in this conflict? . . . The form of
government in Spain should be a matter for the
Spanish people, and no one else. It is for that
reason that we have discouraged, and shall con-
tinue to discourage, outside intervention in her
internal affairs. . . .
"
L
When the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was
asked, on February 15, whether, since Italy’s military aid to
the Insurgents constituted a violation of international law
and the obligation of one member of the League of Nations not
to commit aggression against the political independence of
another member, he was prepared to recommend to the League
that action should be taken regarding the Spanish conflict un-
der Article 10 of the Covenant, Viscount Cranborne replied:
"So far as I am aware there is nothing to
substantiate the suggestion that any attempt is
being made to alienate the territorial integrity
or political independence of Spain. The last part
of the question does not, therefore, arise. ""
94-95 .
822 .
1 . Vol. 319, House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, pp.
2. Vol. 320, House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, P*
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As the Civil War continued, it became increasingly
evident that the sham of non-intervention had succeeded only ir
making a mockery of international law, order, and Justice.
But, despite the obvious folly and great danger inherent in
the British policy, official London, which in 1936 had begun
muddling down the right-center lane of the road of appeasement,
now seemed to incline more and more toward the path on the ex-
treme right.
A letter to the London County Council Motor Licensing
Department from the Foreign Office, dated March 4, 1938, in
which the Insurgents were referred to as the Spanish Nationalist
Government, stated that the Duke of Alba and his staff had been
regarded officially as diplomats in all but name. During a
debate on foreign policy on April 4, Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain was asked why Parliament had not been informed of
this step towards the recognition of General Franco, but gave
no satisfactory answer. L
At about the same time, it was revealed that the
Duke of Alba had been actually passing information on to the
Prime Minister regarding the alleged arrival of foreign troops
for the assistance of the legitimate government of Spain . 2
When Mr. Arthur Henderson asked the Government
whether it had received information of the establishment of an
1. Vol. 334, House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, p. 4.
2. Ibid
.
,
p. 12.
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Italian air base at Palma, Majorca, and of a German air base
at Pollensa, Majorca, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign
Affairs declared that no useful purpose would be served by put-
ting the matter before the Non-Intervention Committee since no
scheme of control for observing the arrival of foreign aircraft
in Spain had been agreed upon or put in force. 1
During the debate of April 4, Prime Minister Chamber-
lain, in giving his reasons for refusing to change His Majes-
ty’s Government's foreign policy on Spain, said:
. . If you remove the embargo on the
supply of arms, it is bound at once to be fol-
lowed by a whole flood of arms and ammunition
and men pouring into Spain from the sympathi-
zers of each side. It would not stop there.
It would very soon extend to the sea, and you
would have sinkings of ships, you would have
drowning of troops, you would perhaps have
naval battles; and the European war would have
begun. That, in my opinion, and in the opin-
ion of my colleagues, would be the result of
the abandonment of non-intervention in Spain,
and we have no intention of changing our pol-
icy in that respect. . . . " 2
Two days later, when the Duchess of Atholl asked the
Government whether it was aware that 32 German steamers had
landed war material in ports under the control of Spanish In-
surgents between January 2, 1938 and March 14, 1938, and that
27 Italian ships bringing arms and munitions to the Rebel for-
ces had entered Spanish ports from February 21, 1938 to March
14, 1938, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs de-
1. Vol. 334, House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, p.3.
2. Ibid., p. 62.
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dared that no information had been received by His Majesty's
Government .
^
Britain moved even further to the Right on November
2, 1938, when the House of Commons ratified, by a vote of 345
to I38, the Perth-Ciano accord of April 16, which took a France
victory for granted and at the same time admitted the farce of
non-intervention. Only a few hours before the vote was taken,
a Spanish Insurgent warship shelled and sank a British-chart-
ered Spanish freighter ten miles off the Norfolk coast. Yet,
Prime Minister Chamberlain could, with satisfaction, declare
that the Spanish Civil War no longer threatened the peace of
the world.
^
On January 27, 1939, James Frederick Green reported
that Britain's willingness to accept an Insurgent victory was
based on the belief that Franco's conservatism would safeguard
investments and trade, that the nationalism of the Insurgents
and their supporters wouldn' t tolerate permanent occupation by
;
the Germans and the Italians, and that the Franco regime would
|
need British financial assistance.^
The Nationalist Government of General Franco was un-
conditionally recognized by the Chamberlain ministry on Febru-
ary 27, 1939, and on the following day, by a vote of 344 to
137, the House of Commons upheld the action of the Government
.
1. Ibid., p. 359.
2. New York Times
,
November 3, 1938, p. 1.
3« Foreign Policy Bulletin , January 27, 1939.
4. New York Times
.
February 28, 1939, p. 1.
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3. Unofficial Aid to Burgos
It would not be too great an exaggeration to state
bluntly that Great Britain, to a considerable degree, financed
the rebellion of General Franco.
Ferdinand Kuhn Jr., in attempting to explain how the
Spanish Rebels could go on fighting for a period of nine
months with no foreign loans to speak of, and without an ade-
quate gold reserve, declared in April 1937
i
"The truth is that Britain, with her great
volume of imports and her growing purchasing
power, is inadvertently one of the most import-
ant single factors in financing General Francis-
co Franco's campaign. . . . Without exports to
Britain from his territory, it is thought here,
the Rebel leader could not go on, no matter how
much war material he might continue to receive
from his German, Italian, and Portuguese friends.
The sale of sherry and oranges to Britain, according
to Kuhn, were only a shade less than one year previously when
there was no civil war. From August 1936 to February 1937,
1,300,000 pound sterling of oranges were bought for cash, and
in the six months prior to April 1937, 1,020,000 pound sterling
of wine was purchased by Britain. 2
The New lork Times , in February 1937, estimated that
the British investment in Spain was equal to about 30,000,000
pound sterling, and was distributed equally in Rebel and Loyal-
ist-controlled territory. Of this total, 10,000,000 pound
1. New York Times
,
April 10, 1937, p. 8.
2. Ibid.
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sterling was invested in the British-owned Rio Tinto mines and
other ore-extracting properties which were confiscated by the
Insurgents to pay Germany for the military assistance rendered
by the Nazis. x
Lan sing' Warren reported in September 1937 that Brit-
ish financiers, who controlled 53«9 percent of the total for-
eign investment in Spain, were actively collaborating with
wealthy Spaniards of monarchist sympathies.^
Perhaps the most significant financial aid received
by the Rebels was the result of shrewd financial manipulation
involving, the Rio Tinto Co., Ltd. of London. During the year
1937, according to the New York Times , 1,250,000 pound sterling
passed from this British-owned mining company to the Franco
regime in exchange for payment in paper money at the fixed rate
of 42 pesetas to the pound. These sterling payments, deposited
according to the value of the products exporter from Spain to
Britain, enabled the Insurgents to obtain sufficient foreign
credits to make 90-day cash payments on purchases of oil from
the United States, as well as buy the much needed supplies of
foodstuffs and materials of war. During 1937, the Rio Tinto
mines, states this article, exported a larger supply of pyrites
to Great Britain than in any previous period. And with each
increase in exports came an increase in the foreign credits of
the Insurgents. ;
1. New~York Times
,
February 5, 1937, p. 6.
2. New York Times
,
September 19, 1937, p. E 5-
3. New York Times , January 17, 1933, p. 7*
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But unofficial aid to Burgos from Britain and from
British subjects was not only financial. On May 5, 1938, Span-
ish Insurgents and members of the aristocracy met with a num-
ber of Gibralter’s most prominent residents. At this meeting,
Mrs. John Mackentosh, wife of Gibralter's wealthiest business
man, was elected president of a committee which resolved to
collect funds and materials in order to supply luxuries to
General Franco’s forces on the various battle fronts.
1
Great Britain aided or attempted to aid the cause of
the Rebels in many different ways. When the Insurgents inter-
fered with British shipping proceeding to Bilbao in March 1937,
Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin announced, on April 12, that due
to the danger from mines, aerial bombing, and interception by
Insurgent warships, British food ships had been instructed not
to proceed to Bilbao.- By attempting to renounce British mar-
itime rights, the Baldwin ministry, through intent or through
ineptitude, was aiding the Rebel effort to starve out the
population of the Loyalist port.
After two heated debates in the House of Commons, the
Government finally agreed that any British vessels which car-
ried non-prohibited cargo could claim full protection of the
Royal Navy beyond the three-mile limit.
*
The British policy of non-intervention, appeasement,
1. New York Times
, May 6, 1938, p. 5.
2. Foreign Affairs
,
July 1937, PP- 667- 670 .
3. Ibid. 7 p. 670.
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and finally retreat in Spain did not even gain Britain the
thanks of the Insurgents or of their Fascist and Nazi allies.
On the contrary, as the London approach to the problem became
more pusillanimous, the German and Italian violations of inter-
national law became more flagrant and more open. And as the
war continued, attacks upon British shipping became more dar-
ing.
On January 31
, 1933, the British freighter, Endymion,
was hit by a torpedo off Cartagena, and three British lives
were lost. On February 5, an Italian plane carrying the In-
surgent insignia bombed and sunk the British vessel, Alcira, en
route to Barcelona with a cargo of coal .
1
On May 8
,
the Brit-
ish destroyer, Grafton, intercepted two Insurgent armed trawl-
ers which were preparing to attack the British tanker, Refast.
Qn the same day, 400 British merchant seaman marched in a body
to the Foreign Office to protest against the "ruthless and ab-
solutely deliberate" attack on British vessels in Spanish
waters, and to demand that the Government take action to cor-
rect the situation immediately .
~
1. Foreign Policy Bulletin
.
February 11, 19 38 .
2. New York Times
, May 9, 1938, p. 6.
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CHAPTER VII
NON-INTERVENTION:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The International Committee for the Application of
the Agreement regarding Non-Intervention in Spain was the chief;
means through which the Western Democracies, unwittingly or
otherwise, aided and abetted the Fascist assault upon the Span-
ish Republic. This chapter will briefly review the more sig-
nificant steps taken by, and the practical effects of, the
activities of this Committee, as well as the League of Nations,
which determined not only the course of the Civil War in Spain,
but also the international trend toward disaster which culmin-
ated in the world tragedy of 1939-1945.
A . The London Non-Intervention Committee
A press report from Paris, dated July 23, 1936, in-
dicated that Premier Leon Blum and Foreign Minister Yvon von
Delbos were quite willing to consider favorably proposals for
aid to the constitutional government in Spain.
1
About one
week later, however, after the French Cabinet had been per-
suaded to forbid all arms shipments to Spain in the name of
"peace" and "non-intervention"-, official Paris decided to ap-
peal to the British and -Italian Governments for "the rapid a-
doption and rigid observance of an agreed arrangement for non-
1. See p.101-
2. Schuman, op. clt ., p. 596.
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Intervention" in the Spanish conflict, and on August 1, Premier
Blum took the initiative 1 for a non-intervention agreement.
Three days later, Great Briatin officially accepted the pro-
posal, and on August 15, Britain and France formally imposed
an arms embargo against Spain.
In spite of information which indicated that the
totalitarian states of the Right had violated the Non-Interven-
tion Agreement and taken direct action in the Spanish Civil
War during July and August, Blum declared on September 6:
"There is not a single piece of circum-
stantial evidence to show that the non-inter-
vention agre-ment has been violated. . . . But
should we undertake a competition of armaments
on Spanish soil? ... If certain Powers furnish
arms and planes to the Rebels, should France
furnish them to the Popular Front?. . .No. . .
After some five weeks of negotiations, the Non-Inter-
vention Committee held its first meeting in the British capital
on September 9« This initial conference, attended by delegates
from 26 nations, proved to be an almost complete failure due to
the surly mood of the Fascist powers and the absence of Portu-
gal, which didn’t send a representative to London until the
meeting of September 28.-
H. M. Brailsford, in discussing the oddity of the new
"neutrality" agreement, said in September 1936:
"... Never before in the diplomatic history
of Europe has any government been debarred from
buying abroad the arms it required to maintain in-
1. See p. 102 for alleged origin of non-intervention
agreement.
2. Schuman, op. cit
.
,
p. 596.
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ternal peace. This new doctrine of spurious
neutrality placed this government sprung as it
is from a recent and decisive election, on a
footing of equality with insurgent soldiers who
lack both legal authority and popular support. .
. . ’We agree to boycott the police, if you will
stop helping the gangsters’ --such are the social
ethics of this doctrine of neutrality."
1
In the opinion of Frederick L. Schuman, the non-in-
tervention of the Western Democracies was, in fact, interven-
tion on behalf of the Rebels. This authority on international
affairs says:
"The ’non-intervention’ agreement was, by
implication, a recognition of the belligerency
of the rebels, though this was later denied by
the British Government. Here, paradoxically,
neutrality was unneutral in its practical effects
and non-intervention was an act of intervention,
both in law and fact, since the signatories de-
nied to Madrid its customary right to purchase
arms to suppress rebellion and thus aided the
insurgents. Germany, Italy, and Portugal, though
parties to the Agreement, surreptitiously sent
war materials to the rebels. . . . "~
Portugal severed diplomatic relations with Madrid on
October 23, 193b, ’’ the same day that Russia declared that,
since Portugal, Germany, and Italy were supplying the Rebels
with arms, she felt herself no longer bound to the Spanish Non-
Intervention Agreement to any extent greater than the remain-
ing participants in the conflict. w -
Five days later, when Portugal threatened to scrap
the agreement on Spain, the London Committee completely exon-
1. The New Republic
,
September 23, 1936, pp. 174-176.
2. I bid . , p. 133.
3.
New York Times
,
October 24, 1936, p. 1.
4. Ibid
.
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erated Italy and Portugal on the grounds that Soviet charges
either had not been proved or had referred to actions which
preceded the adoption of the accord on non-intervention. At
this time Foreign Minister Eden denied that non-intervention
had aided the Insurgents, and, despite the detailed evidence
of violations of the Non-Intervention Agreement offered by
neutral observers in Lisbon, asserted that neither His Majesty’
Government nor the London Committee had any information to sup-
port the Soviet charges against Portugal.
1
However, alarming reports of foreign "volunteers"
arriving on the Spanish scene, together with the premature re-
cognition of the Franco regime by Germany and Italy on Novem-
ber 18, finally disturbed the complacency of the Committee and,
on December 4, Great Britain demanded that a thorough study be
made of the "volunteer" problem. At the same time, France act-
ed with Britain in asking that the other powers cooperate in
the establishment of a control system about the frontiers of
Spain.
-
s
When an arms control plan was finally devised by the
Non-Intervention Committee, the Loyalist Government, on Febru-
ary 2, 1937, announced its acceptance of the scheme in princi-
ple but at the same time reserved the right to buy munitions
where it could.
^
1. Foreign Policy Bulletin
,
November 6, 1936.
2. Annals of the" Ameri can Academy of Political and
Social Science
,
July 1938, p. 57.
3. New York Times , February 3, 1937, p. 5.
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Although a committee of the League of Nations Coun-
cil had issued, on October 2, 1937, a resolution warning the
Fascist and Nazi supporters of the Spanish Rebels that unless
an agreement were soon arrived at concerning the withdrawal
of volunteers from the Iberian Peninsula, League members of
the London Committee would consider ending the policy of non-
intervention
,
1
the text of the Non-Intervention Committee's
proposal for the withdrawal of "volunteers" from Spain was not
published until July 11, 1938. Fifteen days later, the Loyal-
ist regime agreed to accept the plan, but requested that, in
the future, all the major ports of the country be controlled
and that foreign naval patrols cover all of the Spanish coast
line . 1
General Franco, however, would not agree to the Lon-
don scheme which proposed a proportionate reduction of "volun-
teers" from each side. The Insurgent leader v/as quite willing
to accept the proposal provided that 10,000 "volunteers" be
withdrawn from both the Rebel and the Republican forces. This
arrangement would have reduced the number of foreign troops
aiding Franco to 30,000 but would have deprived the Loyalists
of all their outside help.- ;
After more than two and one-half years of enforcing
a one-way neutrality, the plan to guarantee non-intervention
1
. Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science
,
July "T9 33 1 p. 69 .
2. Foreign Policy Bulletin
, August 12, 19 38 .
3 . Foreign Policy Bulletin , August 26, 1938.
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finally collapsed on March 22, 1939, when Germany and Italy re-
fused to pay their long-overdue contributions.
1
B. The League of Nations
The Spanish Civil War gave the League of Nations,
Just as it gave Great Britain and France, a last opportunity
to regain its prestige and authority which had been steadily
waning since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and
the Italian conquest and annexation of Ethiopia in 1935-1936.
By including Articles 6, 7, and 77 in the Constitu-
tion of 1931, the Spanish Republic had proved herself to be
one of the staunchest supporters of the League of Nations. In
Article 6, Spain renounced war as an instrument of national
policy; in Article 7, the Republic bound itself to respect the
universal rules of international law, incorporating them into
its positive law; and in Article 77, the Constitution prohi-
bited the President from signing a declaration of war except
when subject to the conditions prescribed in the Covenant of
the League, and then only after all peaceful means of procedure
Phad been exhausted.
-
"hat obligations, if any, the League of Nations would
have to fulfill under its Covenant was one of the most contro-
versial of subjects in international affairs during the first
few months of the Spanish conflict. Francis 0. 7/ilcox pointed
1. New York Times
,
March 23, 1939, p. 13.
2. Current History
, "Text of the Spanish Constitution,
June 1932, pp. 37^-334. Also Annals , July 1938, pp. 65 - 66 .
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out that, under Article 10 of the Covenant, the League in-
sured the state against external aggression only and did not
insure the state against internal political disturbances,
while under Article 15, it was ruled that disputes arising
from matters solely within the domestic jursidiction of the
state were excluded from the competence of the League Council.
~
But, where did an internal affair cease to be a mat-
ter of domestic jurisdiction and become international in scope?
The League was faced with this dilemma. As a rebellion, the
Spanish Civil War was not a subject coming within the range of
the League's jurisdiction. However, in that the conflict was
an internal disturbance which threatened to produce complica-
tions of an international character endangering world peace,
the struggle in Spain was of the utmost concern to the League. c
On November 18, 1936, the Italian and German Govern-
ments recognized the regime of General Franco, ostensibly on
the grounds that the Insurgents were in possession of the
greater part of Spain, and that chaos reigned in the territory
controlled by the Loyalists. 5 Nine days later, the Spanish
Republic invoked Article 11 of the League Covenant, and asked
the Secretary-General to convene a special session of the
League Council. ^ The premature recognition of the Insurgents
by the Fascist States, together with the Italian and German
1. Annals
,
July 1938, p. 66.
2. I bid
.
,
p. 66.
3. Foreign Affairs , January 1937, P» 274.
4. Foreign Policy Bulletin
,
December 4, 1936.
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naval attacks along the Spanish coast seemed sufficient to the
Loyalists to be considered as a "circumstance affecting inter-
national relations which threatens to disturb international
peace or the good understanding between nations upon which
peace depends." 1 Wilcox maintains that the Republic could Just
as easily have invoked Articles 15, 16, and 17, which involved
the League sanction system, but that friends of Spain persuaded
the Republic’s delegate that a strict application of the Cove-
nant would be impossible.
1
^
Clarence K. Streit, discussing the complexities of
the Spanish question as it confronted the League, said in Dec-
ember 1936 :
"Since the Council must thus start by re-
affirming that Valencia is the legitimate govern-
ment of Spain, it wonders how it can dany Valen-
cia' s plea that it is an unfriendly act for Ger-
many and Italy to aid the Rebels. To answer that
Russia is aiding Valencia is no answer, for no
government can formally agree that it would be
an unfriendly act for one government to aid in
suppressing rebellion and a friendly act for an-
other government to aid the rebels in overthrow-
ing it. . . . The fact that the Spanish Govern-
ment has law on its side cannot easily be dis-
missed as pure legalism. It raises instead a
still broader dilemma--! f the League is not go-
ing to favor the legal side, on what basis can
it operate and what is the use for any country
to strive to keep a good legal record if nothing
is gained thereby?" 5
After the Republic had refrained from placing the
Civil War on the agenda of the 1936 Assembly, her representa-
1. Annals , July 1933, pp. 66- 67 .
2. Ibid., p. 67 .
3* New York Times
,
December 6, 1936, p. E 6.
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tive at Geneva formally placed the question before the League
Council in December 1936, where it was for the time being con-
veniently pigeon-holed.
1
On December 12, after Britain and
France had taken the initiative in preparing for the estab-
lishment of an arms control plan for Spain, the League Council
passed a resolution which made a feeble attempt at reprimanding
p
the Fascist Powers for their intervention in the conflict.
The Spanish conflict was placed before the League
Council again in May 1937, when J. Alvarez del Vayo submitted
a White Book on "Italian Aggression," including 101 facsimil-
ies of all kinds of documents chosen from 2,000 of them sup-
posed to have been captured from Italian troops. According to
the evidence presented by the Spanish delegate, several of the
orders were marked "secret and most urgent," and had been sent
from the Ministry of War in Rome to units of the Italian Army
in Spain.
Anne O’Hare McCormick, in remarking on the fact that
only one of the 101 documents referred to German aggression
and that this document was omitted from the summary released
to the press, declared:
"The whole procedure smacks of a political
manoeuvre for ends beyond the immediate object of
accusing the interventionists and forcing their
withdrawal from Spain. The Spanish delegate must
have had the acquiescence if not the support of
Britain and France in what looks like a move to
placate Berlin and bear down on Rome. This may be
1. Annals
,
July 1933, p. 67 .
2. Ibid .
3. New York Times , May 28, 1937, p. 1.
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good strategy for a desirable end, but it is the
kind of strategy that confirms critics who say
that the powers have used the League for their
own purposes. It explains what has happened at
Geneva. ±
In September 1937, Dr. Koth, the Norwegian Foreign
Secretary offered a proposal to the League Assembly which in-
volved the League’s inviting the two belligerents to agree to
an armistice. When hostilities would be suspended, according
to this plan, a referendum would be taken under League auspices
to settle the form of government in Spain. This proposal met
with absolutely no support .
2
De Madariaga says that the "spirited" resolution
which was presented on October 2, 1937 to the League Assembly
by a committee of the Council, declaring that non-intervention
would be abandoned as the League policy toward the Spanish
Civil War unless all nations respected their obligations under
it, was readily accepted by all League members, but believed
in by none.
On September 20, the League Assembly, by a vote of
24 to 23, refused to re-elect Spain to her semi-permanent seat
in the Council, with a bloc of pro-Franco Latin American na-
tions swinging the vote against Valencia, the new seat of the
h.
Loyalist Government.
When the Spanish Republic’s representative introduced
1. New York Times
, May 29, 1937, P* 16.
2. De Madariaga, op. cit .
.
p. 409.
3. Ibid.
,
p. 399-
4. New York Times
,
September 21, 1937, p« 13.
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a resolution before the League Council, requesting that League
members carry out their pledge of October 2, 1937 to consider
the termination of non-intervention if '’volunteers" were not
withdrawn from Spain, the proposal was rejected by the council,
acting under the orders of Great Britain, by a vote or iour to
two, with nine abstentions. 1
On January 16, 1939, the representative rrom Iran,
president of the committee of three which supervised the evacu-
ation of foreign combatants rrom republican Spain, reported to
the Council on the withdrawal oi Loyalist supporters. In re-
porting on the many high-sounding speeches or praise and appre-
ciation addressed to Spanish Foreign Minister del Vayo, A-rnaldo
Cortesi declared:
"In the general rush or congratulation,
however, all but the French and New Zealand del-
egates rorgot to mention tne Justice oi the de-
mands that withdrawal of foreigners from the
Republican side be matched by a corresponding
withdrawal or foreigners rrom the other side. .
. . Viscount Halifax, British Foreign secretary,
skimmed over this point lightly with the general
statement that it was necessary to put a halt to
foreign intervention ." 2
Thus did the League or Nations, like Great Britain,
like France, and like the Non-Intervention committee, play out
the false string of one-way neutrality to the bitter end. In
allowing itself to be forced into the role or an accessory to
the death of the Spanish Republic, the League or Nations dug
its own grave.
1. Foreign Policy Bulletin
,
May 20, 19 3h.
2. New York Times
.
January 17, 1939, p. 11.
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C. International Law and the Civil War
From an International viewpoint, tne most important
legal issues raised by the Spanish conrlict concerned recogni-
tion of a state of belligerency, recognition of a de racto gov-
ernment, and neutrality and neutral duties.
In the sense that they are internal conrlicts between
different factions struggling to gain control or the government
of the same country, civil wars are questions or a domestic na j
ture and do not come within the jurisdiction of international
law.
Nevertheless, in 1320, since there was no interna-
tional rule which gave foreign powers the right to intervene
in civil strifes or a purely domestic nature, the members of
the Quadruple Alliance, at the Congress or Troppau, pledged
themselves to intervene, with armed force if necessary, to as-
sist any legitimate government wnich was threatened with rev-
olutionary liberal movements. The activities or members or
this Alliance in Naples, Piedmont, and Spain, which followed
the conclusion of the Troppau Protocol, established a prece-
dent for foreign intervention in the internal affairs or a na-
tion torn by civil disturbances.
Charles G. Fenwick, in comparing the situation in
Spain during the Civil War with that which confronted the Quad-
ruple Alliance in 1820, declared:
"What we have been witnessing in Spain ror
the past two years is in a broad way a reversal
of the earlier revolt or liberalism against mon-
archical legitimacy. For this time it is the
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conservative groups that are the reDels; it is
the array anci tne propertied interests that are
questioning the authority or the ae Jure govern-
ment; and in their cnalienge to the constitutional
regime they are receiving the support or clericals
who have normally been on the side or established
order* . . . The practical failure or collective
non-intervention is paralleled by its inherently
Immoral evasion or community responsibility. . . .
It may doubtless be taken as a starting point that
the government in power under the constitution or
the state should have a prima racie claim to the
support or the community or nations in any proce-
dure or mediation. . . .
Although almost from the beginning or the rebellion,
General Franco repeatedly sought to obtain the status oi a bel-
ligerent, such recognition was constantly denied nim oy all oi
the members of the community or nations, with the exception or
Germany, Italy, and a rew other smaller powers. But througn-
out the Civil War, the Western Democracies and the Non-Inter-
vention Committee, while persistently refusing to recognize the
belligerency of the Spanish Insurgents, attempted to eniorce a
policy of strict neutrality toward Spain. Yet, according to
Philip C. Jessup and Charles G. Burllngham, when there is no
belligerency there is no neutrality, and when there is no neut-
p
rality there is no neutral duty or neutrality policy.
Herbert Wright, Professor oi International Law at
Catholic University of America, took the view that when the
belligerency of an insurgency has been recognized by the legit-
imate government, a foreign state is free to withhold or grant
1. American Journal or International Law
,
vol. j}2, 19
pp. 539-54-0.
2. New York Times
,
January jl, 1939, p. 2.
r '
• i . - ,<
f: '
. p ; .
....
. - . .
....
*
.
. t ; i
i. •
t
.
1-33
the same recognition, and that if the foreign power withholds
such recognition, it is oound by international law to abstain
from aiding the Rebels, wnlle remaining iree to grant, or re-
frain from granting assistance to the de Jure government. If
a foreign nation recognizes the belligerency of the forces or
rebellion but does not desire to enter the conflict on either
side, it is oound by International law to abstain from helping
either belligerent.'
When he mentions the recognition or the belligerency
of an insurgency within a state by the legitimate government
of that state, Professor Wright would seem to be confusing
terms. The recognition of a condition or insurgency is quite
different from the recognition oi a condition oi belligerency.
Upon receiving the status or a belligerent, an Insur-
gent regime is recognized as possessing the same rights unaer
international law as tnose granted to a sovereign state when
it is at war. A recognized belligerent may establish a block-
ade, search ships of third powers on the high seas, ana seize
and confiscate goods. 2 No legitimate government grants the
status or a belligerent to Rebels seeking to destory its con-
stitutional authority. The Spanish Government did not recog-
nize that a condition of belligerency existed. It did recog-
nize that a condition of insurgency existed. In drawing a fine
distinction between a state of insurgency and a state oi oel-
1. New York Times
,
April 10, 193b, p. k d.
2. Foreign An airs , January 1937, p. 272.
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llgerency, Philip C. Jessup quotes rrom page b2, volume I or
Charles C. Hyde’s International Law as follows:
"Recognition or a condition oi insurgency
in a foreign country is merely a reckoning with
a state oi facts. It confers no special rights
on the insurgents; it manifests no design to aid
them; it affords no gound or complaint to the
parent State; it imposes on the foreign btate none
of the burdens of a neutral." 1
Italy and Germany not only recognized the belliger-
ency of General Franco, but on November 13, 193b, recognized
the Insurgent regime as the de facto government of bpain.
This premature recognition of the Rebels was definitely, in the
opinion Of Schuman, a violation of the rights of the constitu-
tional government.- Yet, Professor Wright argued that both
the Soviet Union and France, in not recognizing the belliger-
ency of the Insurgents, and the Fascist Powers in not only
recognizing the belligerency of the Franco regime but also con-
sidering it as the de facto government of the country, were
within their rights under international law.
*
Jessup maintains that although international law
does not impose upon states a duty to recognize new government^
at any particular moment, it does brand as an illegal inter-
vention in the domestic affairs or another state a premature
recognition accorded to Rebels with the intent oi aiding them
to overthrow the established government. 4 Of the complications
1. Foreign Affairs
, January 1937, p. 270.
2. Tbld
.T P« 107
»
3. New York Times , April 10, 193*3, p. e b.
4. Foreign Affairs
,
January 1937, p. 279*
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which arose as a result or the action taken by the Fascist
States on November lb, this autnorlty on international law saia:
"The consequence or the extension or recog-
nition by Italy and Germany is that thereafter
for them the Franco government is the government
or Spain and the established government is mere-
ly a rebellious group. In other words, the tables
are completely turned. . . . Italy and Germany
would now be legally tree to supply aid to the
Franco group just as previously any states would
have been free to supply aid to the established
government. . . . Ir the Non-Intervention Agree-
ment were terminated, Italy and Germany might be
found orficially helping the Franco government
which they recognize, while France ana nussia
might officially help the established government
which they recognize. Both groups or Powers woula
assert that they were merely helping the Govern-
ment or Spain to suppress a rebellion. 1,1
The problems in international law created by the
Spanish civil strife will be considered further in that chapter
of Part II which has been devoted to a discussion or the legal-
ity of our neutrality policy toward the Civil War.
1. Foreign Affairs
, January 1937, p. 274.
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